Photos Russian and Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces and Infrastructures

[Ivan le Fou]

WOW Ivan, once again that is great stuff you've posted.....thank goodness these never got used!! Thanks for sharing

Thanks!

 

[Ivan le Fou]

Since, earlier in the thread, I made a post in which a distinction was made between the SS-3 Shyster and SS-4 Sandal, I thought perhaps it could be a good idea to make a post to talk about the differences between the two.



R-5/8A62, R5M/8K51, SS-3 Shyster.

The R-5 and R-5M were a single-stage MRBM with load-bearing tanks, a system for reducing unused fuel residues and a detachable warhead.
The R-5 was the world's first ballistic missile with load-bearing fuel tanks (both fuel and oxidizer).

Initial launches ended up with a flight range being no more than 1000 km due to the destruction of the warhead upon entering the dense layers of the atmosphere.
The warhead design was changed to accommodate a 6 mm thick heat-resistant coating.

Welded seams of the tanks are made by argon-arc welding.
Automated welding was used for the longitudinal seams of the shells and the welding of the bottoms; fittings and flanges was carried out by argon manual welding.


In order to save weight, the missile did not have a sealed instrument compartment.
The control system instruments are located in the tail (above the engine) and in the compartments in-between the tanks. The latter contains only vibration-sensitive gyro instruments and acceleration integrators.
Guidance to the target is carried out by turning the launch pad using topographic referencing data.
The missile is equipped with 4 steering mechanisms.
The antennas for the radio control system are mounted on the outer contour of the fuel tank casing.




R-5

The development of the R-5 started in 1951 as a continuation of the R3, divided in three stages.

The first took place in March-May 1953 and consisted of 8 launches, 6 of which were successful.
2 launches were carried out at a range of 270 km, one at 550 km, and 5 launches at a range of 1200 km (with 2 unsuccessful launches).
The first launch of the R-5 was on March 15, 1953, with The first successful launch at full range on April 19, 1953.


The second stage of testing began on October 30, 1953 with 7 launches at a range of 1185 km, (one of which was unsuccessful).
Its main goal was aimed at correcting the issues responsible for the failures of the first stage. The unsuccessful launches lead to the decision to modify the control system in order to reduce and eliminate the impact the rocket body's vibrations had on it.


The third and final test stage was on 12 August 1954, with 19 launches taking place from August 1954 to February 1955.

During the initial test launches it was discovered the engine jet was shielding the radio range control signals, once the issue resolved 4 more test launches were successfully performed, followed by yet another 10.

All tests were carried out at the Kapustin Yar test site and deemed completed by April 16, 1955.

The remaining R-5s and it manufacturing documentation were placed in mobilization reserve, and work on the nuclear capable R-5M started.




R-5M

The creation of a nuclear warhead was first proposed in a letter from developers to the curator of nuclear issues, L.P. Beria, in 1952.
Initially, the RDS-3M charge was proposed to be modified for the R-2 missile, but the idea was eventually rejected.
Later, the nuclear warhead for the R-5M missile was created on the basis of the RDS-4 charge (referred to as RDS-3M in its early stage of development).

The creation for the R-5M warhead was proposed following the testing of the tactical atomic bomb "Tatiana" with the RDS-4 charge (based on the FAB-3000 and tested from the Il-28 on August 23, 1953). A resolution on the development was issued on April 10, 1954.


The resolution established the a nuclear charge was to be ready by October 1954.
The project as a whole was to be ready by October 1954: 15 missiles (including 10 for flight tests, 5 for test launches).
Flight development (10 sighting tests) to be carried out in October-November 1954, and 5 launch tests in December 1954.

However, though development of the R-5M was officially started on April 20, 1954, work on the design of the missile began at the end of 1953.
The first launch occurred on January 21, 1955, and the final one of the first stage of tests A was on June 6, 1955.
The first round of these launches was to test simulated emergency situations, with scenario going from stabilization malfunction, steering issues and disconnected rudders.
The second sighting stage of flight took place in August-November 1955 with 10 launches. It mostly focused on studying the missiles behavior when loaded with different launch weights.
State tests were initially planned to be conducted in September-October 1955, but were eventually conducted from January 11 to February 6, 1956. During these tests, 4 missiles with mock nuclear warheads were launched and the last fifth missile was launched by a combat crew with a 80kt capable nuclear warhead on February 2, 1956, (Operation Baikal). The nuclear explosion (the warhead having been reduced to 0,3-0,4kt) was carried out in the Aral Karakum Desert, 1190 km away from the launch range, after a 11 minutes flight.

Serial production of R-5M missiles was carried out at the GSZ No. 586.
The first serial lot of 25 missiles began in 1955.
A total of 48 R-5M missiles were produced in 1956-1957, but it is possible that at least 48 more were produced later, to arm engineering brigades and missile divisions.


The R-5M/8K51 missile with a ground-based equipment complex was adopted into service in June 21, 1956, the first military unit begining service in May 1956.
It is worthy of note the R-5M predates the creation of the Strategic Missile Forces (SMF), meaning units with R-5M missiles were part of the Long-Range Aviation (8 brigades were deployed during this time).
The R-5M missiles were replaced by R-12 in 1961.

First public sighting of the R-5M, on November 7 1957.
Launch and ground equipment:
- The R-5 launch ground complex was created by unifying the launch complexes developed for the R-1 and R-2 missiles.

It consisted of a ground towed carriage-erector 8U212, towed by the AT-T tractor, launched from the 8U212 launch pad.
The launch complex includes several vehicles and trailers.

Launch pad 8U212.

Launch site organization.

- R-5M was launched from a 8U212 pad.
The missile is transported on a trailer-lifting ramp and lifted, fitted to the pad by a 8U25 installer vehicle.
Similarly to the R-5 the R-5M launch complex includes several vehicles and trailers. A similar launch complex with modifications was used on the R-12, R-14 and R-16.

8U25.

R-5M being fitted on a 8U212 pad by a 8U25.

Launch site diagram.
The auxiliary vehicles usually consisted of:
- 8N811 autonomous test vehicle;
- 8N14 horizontal test vehicle;
- 8G119 fuel tanker;
- 8G18 oxidizer tanker;



Performance characteristics of the missile:

R-5:
Length: 22,115m
Diameter: 1,650m
Span: 2,640m
Starting weight: 28.570kg
Warhead weight: 1000-1425kg standard.
Dry mass: 4200kg
Fuel mass: 24300kg
Maximum range: 1200km
Minimum range: 270km
Range with 2 suspended warheads: 810km
Range with 4 suspended warheads: 560km
KVO: +-6000m
Pre-launch preparation time: 2 hours.
Time spent in a fueled state of readiness for launch: up to 30 days


R-5M:
Length: 20,747m
Diameter: 1,650m
Span: 3,452m
Starting weight: 28610 / 29100 / 29500 kg
Warhead weight: 1300-1364 kg nuclear.
Dry mass: 4390 kg
Fuel mass: 24900 kg
Maximum range: 1200 km
Minimum range: 270 km
KVO: 2400 m / 3700 m
Pre-launch preparation time: 2 hours.
Time spent in a fueled state of readiness for launch: up to 30 days


Combat equipment:

R-5:

Warhead:
The warhead is of an ogive shape with a sharp nose and a conical stabilizing skirt in the tail section.
Heat-resistant coating based on sublimating materials.
The warhead is separated using a pneumatic pusher.
The warhead weight is 1450 kg.
The fuse is contact.

Regular payload:
-High explosive warhead.
Weight - 1000 kg.
-High-explosive warhead + 2 additional side suspended high-explosive warheads.
Weight of one additional warhead - 958 kg.
-High-explosive warhead + 4 additional side suspended high-explosive warheads.
Total warhead weight - 5282 kg (main + 4 suspended).

Special payload:
"Generator-5" was a R&D project for a dirty bomb.
Work was started on November 16, 1955.

R-5M:

Warhead:
4R warhead developed by KB-11.
The warhead is made shorter in order to reduce the speed of impact with the ground.
The warhead is separated using a pneumatic pusher.
The warhead weight is 1364 kg.
The fuse is contact.

Regular payload:
High explosive warhead for combat training and test launches.

Special payload:
- in service until 1968 - 40 kt.
- in service from from 1958 to 1960 - 300 kt.
- 1 Mt.

 

[Ivan le Fou]

R-12 / R-12 U - SS-4 Sandal

The design of the R-12 missile was based on the R-5M MRBM, with its dimensions identical to those of the R-5M missile. Later, in order to increase the operational range, the length of the fuel tanks was increased, and the design was strengthened to allow for the use a heavier nuclear warhead.
The general layout of the missile consists of a warhead, an adapter compartment, an oxidizer tank, an instrument compartment, a fuel tank, and a tail compartment.

The preliminary design of the new 8K63 missile was approved in March 1955.
The range of the missile was to be at least 1,200 km with a conventional warhead.
The length of the tanks was increased, the design was strengthened, and a the creation of a new RD-214 engine was proposed to accommodate the changed weight and dimensions. OKB-456 was put in charge of developing and testing the RD-214 engine from 1955 to 1957.
The technical design was released in October 1955, and the working drawings were transferred to production in December 1955.
The R-12 missile qualification tests were scheduled for September - October 1957 with the first test fire (M2-3) being conducted in March 1957 at R-I 229 in Zagorsk. Three more test fires were conducted immediately after for a total of 8 launches, including 1 emergency launch. Based on the results of the first stage of testing, the liquid nitrogen used for pressurizing the tanks was replaced with hydrogen peroxide.

Serial production of 8K63 missiles was carried out at several plants and production began in October 1958.

A total of 2,300 missiles were produced.


The R-12 / 8K63 missile was accepted into service in March 4, 1959.
R-12 missiles began as part of missile regiments in the Baltics (Plunge), Belarus (Slonim, Novogrudok, Pinsk, Gezgala), Ukraine and Kazakhstan in mid-1959. They were issued nuclear warheads as soon as the SFM was created.

On May 15, 1960, the following units entered combat duty with the 8K63:
- the 85th missile regiment of the 33rd missile division (Belarus)
- the 25th missile regiment of the 24th missile division (Kaliningrad)
- 94th Missile Regiment of the 23rd Missile Division (Estonia)
Further, the divisions and regiments were put on combat duty during 1960-1963. However some regiments were not equipped with warheads until April 1961.

The R-12 missile was removed from service in 1989 under the INF Treaty.



Launchers, ground equipment and organization.

- R-12:

The 8P863 launch complex consisted of a 8U217 launch pad, similar to the one used for the R-5M; and up to 12 vehicles, similar to the ones used for the R-5M with the exception of the 8U210 installer based on the MAZ-529V.

Time to prepare the complex for launch is about 2 hours.


- 1960: a missile regiment with R-12 included 2 to 3 divisions with 4 to 6 ground-based launchers.
The division included 2 to 4 batteries with 1 launcher each and an attached assembly brigade of the missile-technical battalion.

- 1962 - 1989: a missile regiment with R-12 included 2 divisions with 8 ground-based launchers and 1 division with 4 silo launchers.
The silo-based division included 2 batteries with 2 launchers each.
The missiles were stored in concrete storage facilities, with 2 units each.
The missile regiments had at least 5 ground launchers, 11 to 14 vehicles, 6 to 7 missile installers, 45 to 52 fuel trucks.

R-12 installation on a 8U217 launch pad.

R-12 8U210 missile installer.

Fuel tanker truck from the R-12.

R-12 on transport trailer without warhead.

R-12 warhead on transport truck.

Mobile launch site diagram.



- R-12U:

- 8P863 launch complex, with 8U217 launch pad and ground equipment complex, similar to R-12.
- experimental silo-based launcher "Mayak".
2 copies of the silo-based launcher were built for testing the experimental version of the 63Sh silo-based missile.

Later, the 63S1, designed for space launch vehicles, were tested and launched from the Mayak-2 silo.

Silo launchers "Mayak-2" (left) and 8P763P (possibly test site) with 63S1 and 11K63 respectively.


- 8P763 Dvina silo launch complex.

The silo was a concrete well 30 m deep and 7 m in diameter, at the bottom of which the rocket launch pad was installed.
When the engine was started, hot gases exited into the gas duct between the shaft of the silo and the launch metal cup.
In the upper part of the silo, the gas duct had an extension and guide vanes to divert hot gases to the side in order to reduce the thermal impact on the rocket.
The silo was protected by a multi-ton "roof" which slid along the a set of rails before the rocket was launched.

R-12 installation steps in a 8P763 "Dvina" silo complex.

Diagram of the 8P763 "Dvina" silo complex.


The Dvina complexes consisted of 4 silos located at the corners of a rectangle measuring 80 x 70 m, a command post, and a refueling system.

Performance characteristics.


Length - 22.768 m
Length without warhead - 17.7 m
Body diameter - 1.652 - 1.8 m
Engine "skirt" length - 3.3 m
Stabilizer span - 2.652 m

Weight - 41.800 / 42.200 kg
Warhead weight - 1.364 / 1.680 kg (light / heavy warheads)

Range:
- 1,000-1,200 km (8A63)
- 2,100 km (8K63, officially)
CEP:
- during tests at launches at 2,000 km - range deviation up to 1,100 m, course deviation up to 600 m
- up to 5,000 m (maximum according to performance characteristics)

Launch preparation time - up to 3 hours (from a ground launch pad)


Combat equipment:

- conventional warhead - high-explosive, 1.364 kg.

- thermonuclear warhead 8F12 / 8F12N / AA21, 1.150 kt.

- thermonuclear 8F126 / AA48-2, 2.3 Mt, weighing 1.680 kg. Developed by 1963

- thermonuclear 8F128 for the unified R-12U.

- "Tuman" cassette-type chemical warhead, developed in the early 1960s.

- experimental systems of false warheads and jamming for R-12 and R-12U, developed in 1967.


Variants :

- 8A63.
First version of the preliminary design.

- R-12 / 8K63.
Second version of the missile, a serial medium-range missile, development began on the basis of the 8A63 project with its modifications in 1954.

- R-12Sh / 63Sh / 8K63Sh.
Experimental missile, for experimental launches from the experimental silo launcher "Mayak".

- R-12U / 8K63U.
Unified (for ground and silo launchers) serial version of the R-12 missile.

- R-12N / 8K63U.
Unified R-12U missile (for ground and silo launchers) in a ground-based version with the 8P863 equipment complex.

- 8K63E / 8K63K / 8K63V / 8K63Kr.
Missiles equipped with false targets and jamming sources "List" (8K63E), "Kaktus" (8K63K), "Verba" (8K63V), "Krot" (8K63Kr).

- 63S1 / 8K63S1.
Launch vehicle for an artificial earth satellite.
The launch vehicle was created by adding a second stage to the R-12.

- 11K63 / 63S1M "Raduga".
Launch vehicle created on the basis of the 63S1.

- 8K63B.
Launch vehicle of the Bor-1 system.

 

[Ivan le Fou]

15P011 / 15A11 Perimeter.

Contrary to popular beliefs, not all missiles are meant to carry an explosive payload, and not all ICBMs are meant to offensive or retaliatory weapons.

Such is the case of the 15A11.
As part of the 15E601 Perimeter system the combination was meant to allow for the orders of the strategic forces command to units and formations on the use of forces and assets during a nuclear missile attack to be conveyed, when conventional means are either difficult or impossible.
The 15A11 was therefore treated as a special command missile. In the West, the system was colloquially known as "Dead Hand"

Initially, the MR-UR100/ 15A15 ICBM was supposed to be the missile on which the 15A11 would be based, but was instead supplanted by its more advanced and final iteration MR-UR100UTTH / 15A16 (SS-17 Spanker).

The program for the system started on August 30, 1974.
The preliminary design was developed in December 1975.

The cruise stages are completely identical to the MR-UR100UTTH / 15A16, which allowed for significantly reducing the cost and time spent on the program.

The only genuinely new part of the system was its radio-technical "warhead", identified as 15B99.

To operate properly, the 15B99 had to have a constant orientation in space during its flight, thus requiring the use of a stabilization system. As it turned out, the 15F678 Mayak warhead, developed to be used on the R36M (SS-18) ICBM, was developed around that principle, and since it was deemed to be very proficient at its task, the 15F678 was used as the base for the 15B99. Thus reducing costs even more.

Flight and design tests of the 15A11 command ICBM began in 1979 at NIIP-5 in Baikonur.
For the flight tests, two experimental silo launchers were put into operation, and 10 15A11 ICBMs were prepared (only 7 if which were fired).

A special command post was also created, equipped with combat control equipment developed to test the remote control and launch capabilities of the command missile. A shielded anechoic chamber equipped with equipment for autonomous testing of the radio transmitter was also built.

The first launch of the 15A11 was fitted with a mock-up of the 15B99, and was completed on December 26, 1979.

Further flight tests involved the missiles and the Perimeter system as a whole. 15A14, 15A16, and 15A35 ICBMs were launched from real combat positions based on orders transmitted to the 15B99 in flight.
Additional antennas were previously mounted on the silos of these missiles and new receiving devices were installed.

All PUs and command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces were subsequently subjected to these modifications.

In January 1985, the Perimeter complex, with 15A11 command missile, was placed on combat duty in the 510th Missile Regiment of the 7th Missile Division. The 15A11 was removed from duty at the implementation of the START-1 Treaty in June 1995.

Length: 22,51m (15A15), 22,15m (15A16)

Take-off weight: 71.1 t (15A15), 71.2 t (15A16)
15B99 weight: 1,412 kg

Range: 4,500 km
Maximum orbit: 4,000 km

 

[Ivan le Fou]

While, early on during the Cold War, the Soviet leadership was looking to create large, centralized but hardened command posts for COG/COOP purposes, it became obvious as the cold war progressed that many of these structures were becoming vulnerable to advances in weapons at an alarming quick rate.

This lead to a parallel strategy of dispersal, creating a cloud of smaller re-location sites around Moscow.
Such cloud, and to enable bypass of coms around Moscow, should Moscow be destroyed, was supported by a wide range of infrastructures.

These elements of the "cloud" were created as redundant back ups for the so-called "01"-"02"-"03" rings.

As a part of this program a number of hardened telephone exchanges have been built around Moscow, which can be seen through guided tours of site 305:

http://youtube.com/watch?v=8zuGMXzSpI4

https://youtube.com/watch?v=ftmX916NlQg


Obviously, such re-location plans are nothing new, with the US, itself, having built a similar and extensive networks on the East Coast.

However I am still to find documents indicating other countries, especially nuclear powers, having developed similar infrastructures.

 

[droopy]

Imagine what China has build for their Party.

 

[Ivan le Fou]

Imagine what China has build for their Party.

I would be very interested in learning about the Chinese program.

 

[Ivan le Fou]

How would the Soviet nuclear forces operate in the late 1980s.

First of, there was a robust primary system, with the General Staff Central Command Post having direct C2 over the entire triad, with numerous redundant facilities: 3 hardened ones for the General Staff alone, and a number of separate ones for other services.

Thus allowing for rapid Launch on Warning.

However, would circumstances call for it, a number of fall back options would also be available to fill the gap.

For instance, the airborne Command Post of the General Staff (and those of services) could use the older, yet reliable, method relying on EAM-like messages to communicate launch orders to the mobile Division level Command Posts. The airborne VLF could also be used as relays when exercising C2 over SSBNs.

Such platforms would include, among others, the Il-22 and subsequent Il-22M, for C2 duties, and Tu142MR for long-range communication duties with SSBNs.

With these various Division level Command Posts using robust, wideband noise-like signals, LF/MF back up radio link to launch the weapons remotely, bypassing the Regiment level crews.

In which case, through the MAZ 543A 15V129.

The alternative method would be to go through the use of the "Perimetr" complex, previously talked about.
The airborne Command Post to communicate with the Perimeter Radio Command Center (static or mobile, depending on the kind) and transmit the order it to launch the command missiles (silo or TEL based). Command missiles would then go on to transmit launch commands in data, over radio, to launchers.

In theory, and if issued the proper conditional authorization, RCCs can launch command missiles on their own, for instance, if they lost communications with the main hardened command posts (of the General Staff and Strategic nuclear Forces) following confirmed nuclear detonations against them (via sensors, seismic effects, etc...).

Now, this is in theory. Direct launch of command missiles (or missiles in general) was not something Cold War era airborne Command Posts were able to do. Later, more advanced and modernized systems, such as the Il-22m, A-50 and A-100, would be designed to fulfill these tasks, among other things.


The key challenges, if not weak points, of this Soviet NC3 configuration were the operational realities and flexibility.

In term of operational realities, mobile Command Posts and relays would not be constantly held on airborne or high levels of alert.
This was, in some kind of a way, compensated by the Strategic nuclear Forces deciding to invest into a DUSC (Deep Underground Support Center) -like Command Post was wise, even if it was not yet operational in that time line and presented a significant target for a decapitation strike.

Flexibility wise, while this NC3 allowed execution of a number of scenarios, the Strategic nuclear Forces had weapon systems tied to a limited number of pre-generated flight plans, with the flight plan generating computer remaining vulnerable.

At the same time, despite those issues, the US might not have been able to reliably behead the Soviet forces at this point, due to the various and numerous redundancies and survivability measures (hardening and mobility) set in place. However, that nonetheless remained a risk for much of the earlier times of the Cold War.
For example while ELINT/SIGINT would have been useful in general, it would have limited uuse and usefulness due to the one way propagation of information (high level CP -> Monolith/Vyuga -> low level CP -> Efir -> launcher), mobile nature and relatively short transmission times.

A third challenge remained, being the targeting and elimination of the political leadership. But again, degrees of redundancy with multiple Cheget terminals and the mechanism of the "conditional delegation" with Perimeter, etc, somewhat patched things up.

To this day, the general aspect of things for modern Russia remains broadly the same.


Incidentally, the USSR weren't the only one facing these very same issues and the movie By Dawn's Early Light, though vulgarizing, illustrates a few of them.


edit:

Furthering a bit on the whole "Perimeter" thing, while command missiles of the system were developed after the Emergency Rocket Communications System, they were effectively acting as relays for transmitting data over radio, and not voice over radio Emergency Action Messages.

Furthermore, and I think this has been sufficiently implied, they were huge differences in term of how they could be launched.
While the Soviets focused on land based RCCs (first hardened static, then mobile), with launch over radio, the US, on the other hand, quickly adapted the system for the launch to be initiated from a command plane via the Airborne Launch Control System.

Incidentally, despite the significant technological developments US did not adopt data relay payload for their missile forces, in order to enable relay of launch commands to the LFs directly via the ALCS receiver, thus avoiding vulnerable LCCs, with voice over radio EAMs.

 

[Ivan le Fou]

View attachment 518718View attachment 518719View attachment 518720

Details of the 15Zh61's folding nose-cone.

 

[Ivan le Fou]

Oreshnik (Hazel).

SS-X-31B / SS-X-34
Medium-range ballistic missile developed by the MITT.

So far, very little is known about the system, the little information we have access to are a mixed bag of contradictory statements and speculations.
However, a number of verifiable, factual elements, such as nature, range and capabilities are, though also based on a modicum amount of speculation, relatively established.
Hence, expect a reasonable amount of "it is believed".


It is believed that the theoretical development of the system, codenamed "Kedr", likely began in 2022 or earlier. The missile is being developed using developments from other MITT-developed missile systems, such as the Yars and Bulava.
In July 2023, it is believed Russia's leadership decided to develop a non-nuclear version of the missile based on the RS-26 (SS-X-31) Rubezh ICBM.

According to Western data and based on experience with previous mobile ground-based missile systems, cooperation on the development of this missile system includes:

- Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology - lead developer for the complex and the rocket;
- Federal Scientific and Production Center "Titan-Barricades" (Volgograd) - autonomous launcher and auxiliary vehicles;
- TsNIIAG (Moscow) - development of rocket control system devices;
- FTsDT "Soyuz" - development of the propulsion system;
- OKB "Prozhektor" (Moscow);
- Concern "Sozvezdie" (Voronezh);
- Scientific and Production Enterprise “Spetsenergomekhanika” (Moscow);
- Research Center of Special Equipment and Conversion “Continent” (Moscow).


Missile testing reportedly began with a first launch from the Kapustin Yar test site in October 2023, followed with another one in June 2024.

The third test launch was a combat test: on November 21, 2024, the missile (or missiles) were used against a practical target, namely the Yuzhmash Production Association in Dnepropetrovsk.
Notably it also was the first use of MIRVs in combat.
The payload used is reportedly a new type of MIRV, with a cluster filling (6 x 6 warheads for a total of 36). Though it could also be a set of actual warheads and missile defense system decoys.

Following the November 21's launch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces S. Karakayev proposed accepting The Oreshnik PGRK into service. And on December 18, 2025, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Gerasimov announced that the first brigade equipped with the Oreshnik missile system would be formed in 2025.

A second combat launch got carried out on January 8, 2026. The targets were, reportedly, "critical infrastructures" in or near Lviv.
Though no BDA were made available at this time, the only element available is the range got increased from 800km (first combat launch from Kapustin Yar) to 1500km (from Kapustin Yar).
On December 17, 2025, according to a statement by Belarusian President Lukashenko, the first Oreshnik systems entered combat duty in Belarus.
Satellite image from November 16, 2025, and published on December 27, 2025, reportedly shows the proposed deployment location at the site of the abandoned Krichev-6 airbase.

Layout of facilities on the Krichev-Shesterovka railway line and the territory of the disbanded Krichev airbase.

Changes made to the infrastructure of the Krichev airbase as of November 20, 2025.


Based on the experience with similar missile systems entering service with the Russian Armed Forces, it can be assumed with a relative level of certainty that the first division of the Oreshnik system is based at Kapustin Yar.
The Krichev-6 base likely currently houses only one division of the Oreshnik, with 3 to 4 automatic launchers. This could potentially be expanded to a regiment (9 automatic launchers) or a brigade (12 automatic launchers).


Launch and ground equipment : assuming the Oreshnik is based on the Rubezh PGRK, the launcher is probably either made and/or based on the MZKT-79291 chassis, or on one of its modification.

The Oreshnik missile.

Missile design : presumably a two-stage solid-fuel missile with a MIRV and a warhead dispersal stage.

Oreshnik SS-X-31-B / SS-X-34, based on the RS26 Rubezh.

RS-26 Rubezh.



Based on the two videos documenting the operational use of the system, it is believed the missile utilizes a new MIRV design, with each reentry vehicle being equipped with its own control system and engine.

The recovered wreckage of a gas generator system, after the first operational use on November 21, 2024, could therefore either be part of the flight correction system of an individual MIRV.

However, it can also refute this assumption and be nothing more than a traditional bus design.


Propulsion systems : cruise engines for all stages of the rocket - solid propellant rocket motors.

Based on pieces of the wreckage recovered, the warhead launch stage is presumably controlled by a multi-nozzle solid propellant engine-gas generator.

Initial speculations were the Oreshnik was either a revival of the RS-26, a modification of the RS-26 or an entirely new system based on the RS-26.

However, some of the parts collected on sites, further muddy the water when it comes to what the missile either is or is based on, and tend to open new perspectives.

It turns out that part of the engine-gas generator is found in procurement documents for the 3K-30 Bulava complex from 2013. (https://www.tenderguru.ru/tender/10388996)

If accurate, it could imply the Oreshnik shares, hypothetically, commonalities with the submarine launched ballistic missile 3K-30 Bulava. Or, to a broader extent, being a land based version of the Bulava.

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Performance :

Weight at launch - less than or about 40 tons (estimate)
Payload weight- at least 1200 kg (estimate)

Range: 800km - 1500km - with a maximum claimed at 5000 km (as per Ukrainian sources: https://t.me/stranaua/177460)
Maximum speed: 10M (as per Russian claims: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75614) to 11 M (as per Ukrainian claims: https://t.me/DIUkraine/4878)


Warhead :

Based on the two operational uses of the missile, it can be established it carries, or can carry, non-nuclear warheads. However, a nuclear version of the missile's warhead cannot be ruled out in the future.

Based on the launch from November 21, 2024, it is hypothesized the Oreshnik could be fitted with a cluster warhead with 6 groups of 6 warheads each.

However it could also be theorized the Oreshnik could be fitted with a set of heavy decoys, either based on, or similar to, the 9B899 used on the Iskander-M.

Potentially, the warheads could be equipped with solid propellant rocket motors.

The coating material of the surface of the warheads is believed to allow it to sustain heating temperature up to at least 4000° C.

Operational organization of the system:

It is to be believed the Oreshnik missile system division likely operates like any of the already existing mobile IRBM/ICBM structures and therefore presumably includes:

- 3 APU RK "Oreshnik" possibly on the MZKT-79291 chassis.
- Combat duty support vehicle type 15V240M.

- Combat control vehicle (command post) type 15V180.

- Communication vehicle type 15V190.
- Engineering support and camouflage vehicle 15M69M (probably).
- UTM-80M (probably).

 

[Ivan le Fou]

Following my post on the Oreshnik and its possible ties to the RS-26 Rubezh, I thought i might just as well make one on the Rubezh.

RS-26 Rubezh/Avangard, KY-26, SS-X-31
The rationale behind the RS-26 is to produce a strategic missile system either made of an intercontinental ballistic missile with increased accuracy, or, more simply, a "small-sized" ICBM.

"Small-sized ICBM" can be understood in a variety of ways and will, eventually, be explained later on.

The complex is developed by the MITT, with Yuri S. Solomonov likely being the chief designer, and began no later than 2006 with a completion scheduled for 2013.

The first test launch was expected in 2011 and most likely ended in an accident on September 27, 2011.
However, another way of looking at things is the hypothesis that the first launch was in fact a "toss-up test" for a new type of autonomous launcher and was, ultimately, successful in and of itself.
The second launch took place from a mobile launcher at the Plesetsk test site on May 23, 2012, with the test warhead arrived in the designated area of the Kura test site in Kamchatka.
The third launch was successfully conducted from the Sary-Shagan test site at Kapustin Yar on October 24, 2012. This test was likely conducted to assess the anti-missile capabilities of the warhead.
A second similar launch, and ultimately the fourth, was conducted on June 6, 2013. Reports as to what was being tested remain unclear.

According to what was reported by Izvestia, the first three launches were carried out with ballast instead of warheads and only the fourth was carried out with a mock-up of the standard warhead. (https://iz.ru/news/541042)
The newspaper also reported that the warheads of the Avangard missile complex have their own engines and can maneuver along the trajectory both in direction and speed. Allegedly, to accommodate the new type of combat load, the missile body has been lengthened and its configuration has been changed. This information could also mean the use of a new, larger, module for launching warheads.

The name "Avangard" complex, or missile, was first mentioned in an interview with Russian Defense Minister A. Serdyukov on July 1, 2011. The context was the tripling of the supply of strategic missiles to the RVSN during a period from 2011 to 2015.
From what transpired, the complex/missile allegedly differed from the previous generations in its "significantly enhanced capabilities of combat control and communications systems" (which can also be interpreted as a reference to the Yars-M), as well as, possibly, the a new type of fuel in the rocket stages being introduced (https://lenta.ru/news/2012/05/23/testfire/).
On that matter, Izvestia also reported that the warheads of the Avangard missile complex have their own engines and can maneuver along the trajectory both in trajectory and speed. Additionally, in order to accommodate the new type of payload, the missile body has been lengthened and its configuration altered. This information could also mean the use of a new, larger, module for launching warheads. (https://iz.ru/news/541042)
That hypothesis is given credence by the fact the RS-26 missile system, also usually known and referred to as "Rubezh", was named "Yars-M" in a statement by Colonel general Viktor Yesin in July 21, 2015 (https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/2132865). Wether the reporting is accurate, a misunderstanding or some "loss in translation", the conclusion remains speculative in part.

The name "Avangard" could very well refers to the missile used by the system.


Launch equipment:

MZKT-79291.
The MZKT-79291 chassis, a mobile, highly maneuverable automatic launcher, similar to the one used for the Yars, but with some design differences, is probably used.
In 2008, the Minsk WTP delivered a set of technical design documentation for the MZKT-79291 chassis, in a modern version, for the launcher of the PGRK to MITT, which carried out the relevant R&D with MZKT.
Wheel arrangement - 12 x 12 (steerable 1, 2, 5 and 6 axles).
Cab - three-seater.
Engine - diesel 854.10 with a capacity of 650 hp.
Total mass - (launch vehicle and missile) less than 80 tons.
MZKT-79292.
Allegedly, at the first stage of the missile system design, the 10x10 MZKT-79292 was planned to be used, but the carrying capacity turned out to be insufficient.
Externally, the chassis is similar to its predecessor, the experimental 5-axle chassis MZKT-7929, but differs in all-wheel drive, engine and larger tires.
Wheel arrangement is 10 x 10 (steered - 1, 2, 4 and 5 axles).
Cabin - three-seater.
Engine - diesel V-8 YaMZ-8463.10 with a capacity of 503 hp.
Gearbox - 9-speed YaMZ-202-04.
Suspension - independent, hydropneumatic.
Length - 15.9 m.
Width - 4.28 m.
Load capacity - 35 t.
Gross weight - 63 t.
Maximum speed - 45 km/h.
Turning radius - no more than 20 m.
KAMAZ-7850.
In the first half of 2013, there was an opinion that the launcher could be implemented on the KAMAZ-7850 chassis created under the R&D "Platforma-O", conducted by KAMAZ OJSC.
The chassis was meant to have a carrying capacity of 50 tons.
However, with regard to the "Rubezh" complex, the use of that chassis turned out to be impossible primarily due to delays, and the use of a 16 x 16 chassis viewed as excessive for this missile system.
Wheel arrangement - 16 x 16.
Transmission type - electric.
Load capacity - 85 tons.

Therefore it can be assumed, the KAMAZ-7929-1 is the chassis used to act as the launcher.


However the configuration of the launcher remains unknown.

The "Avangard" missile of the "Rubezh" / "Avangard-Rubezh" complex.
Design.

It is likely the missile's design retains a certain continuity with the designs of the Topol, Topol-M, Yars. There is also the possibility it retains a continuity with the 15P159 Kuryer ICBM.
The missile likely has 2-3 stages and a warhead dispensing module.

Overall, the Avangard's design is based on the solutions incorporated into the Yars, but with an amount of differences with regards to the layout, the materials and components.

The missile body has been lengthened and its configuration has been narrowed to accommodate a new type of combat payload (MIRVs equipped with their own engines).
The control and guidance system is likely based on a classic inertial guidance system with updated components. The missile's guidance system likely also allows for rapid changes to the flight mission and target distribution before launch.

Engines:
- sustainer stages - solid propellant rocket motors, likely using new fuel types.
- warhead dispersal stage - also likely a solid.
Launch weight:
- not less than 40 tons.

Range (estimated):
- minimum - 2000 km.
- maximum - not less than 6000 km.

Warhead:
A single training warhead was used in the test launch on May 23, 2012. Though Interfax news agency reported that "the missile is equipped with a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle and has a range of means to penetrate anti-ballistic missile defense" (https://www.interfax.ru/politics/txt.asp?id=247020).

It is possible that, in the interests of creating combat equipment for the Avangard system, the 4th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation participated in the Proryv R&D project to create MIRVs with advanced means to penetrate anti-ballistic missile defense.

MIRVs were reportedly tested on June 6, 2013.
However, based on the general vision for the missile's properties, along with its purported task, as of the beginning of July 2013, the use of a MIRV is considered unlikely, though still possible. It is therefore theoretised the missile's warhead is identical, likely completely, to the warhead of the RS-24 Yars.

 

[Ivan le Fou]

D-30 / 3K-30 / B-30 "Bulava-M"
R-30 / 3M-30 / RSM-56 "Bulava"
SS-NX-32 / SS-N-32
Submarine-launched ballistic missile with intercontinental range.

Developed by the MITT, by chief designer Yury S. Solomonov and then, since September 20, 2010, by A. P. Sukhadolsky.
The missile's preliminary design reportedly began in 1992.

The development incorporated results from the 15Zh59 Kuryer using a new type of composite fuel for solid-propellant rocket motors.

Initial plans called for the SLBM's mass to be 26-28 tons. However, and for the same reasons that lead to the design of the 3M91 Bark SLBM's second and third stages to be altered, the missile's weight and dimensions were changed. The reason being, namely, the conversion of the fuel manufacturer in Ukraine, the Pavlograd Chemical Plant, to the production of household chemicals. The fuel change reduced the rocket's energy general output, leading to a reduction in the number of warheads.


The Bulava-30 missile was referred to in literature from the early 2000s as the Topol-MPL. However, the default designation for the missile is 3M-30 Bulava-30.
Some of its components are shared with the Topol-M ICBM and likely the RS-24 Yars.

Following the third unsuccessful launch of the Bark SLBM, Russian government ministers Urinson and Sergeyev (former commander of the RVSN) raised the issue of transferring the design of the Navy's main SLBM to the MITT. An Interdepartmental Commission, including representatives of the MITT, the Armaments Directorate of the MoD and the RVSN, was thus created by order of the MoD, to study the failures of the tests. In its results it recommended for the tests to be continued, following the adoption of two Project 941U SSBNs into service, however representatives of the Armaments Directorate and the RVSN proposed to stop developing the SLBM altogether. The main reasons being:
- development of a "highly unified inter-service small-sized missile" for the RVSN (Topol-M) and the Navy (Bulava);
- funding distribution for the rearmament of the RVSN and the Navy (for the procurement of Topol-M and Bulava);
- cost savings;

The commission's findings and recommendations were approved in early 1998 by the Military-Technical Council of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

In the fall of 1998, at the suggestion of Navy Commander-in-Chief V. Kuroyedov, the Russian Security Council officially closed the Bark project, and after a competition sponsored by Roscosmos (including MITT and the Makeyev State Research Center) the design of the SLBM "Bulava" began at MITT.
Simultaneously, the redesign of the Project 955 SSBN to accept the Bulava began.
Control over the development of SLBMs was assigned to the 4th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of Russia (headed by V. Dvorkin), which had previously been engaged in supervising the creation of ICBMs, and the "naval" 28th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of Russia was removed from work on SLBMs.

Cooperation of enterprises involved with the creation of the D-30 Bulava:
- MITT
- Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant - serial production
- VNIITF - warheads
- MIT and NPO Iskra - solid propellant rocket motors
- FSUE FNPC Altai jointly with FSUE FTsDT Soyuz - fuel for all solid-propellant rocket motors
- NPO Avtomatiki im.academ.N.A.Semikhatov - control system
- GRC im.Makeyev - shipborne combat launch complex
- KBSM - launcher
- KB Motor and TsKB Titan - arsenal and other ground equipment


Design of the Bulava SLBM was likely already underway as of December 1998, when the NPO Avtomatiki im.academ.N.A.Semikhatov became the lead developer of the control system, in cooperation with the NPC AP on command devices.
At the same time, the GRC im.Makeyev was working on the design of the system's communications systems and equipment, in cooperation with the MITT.
Development of solid-propellant rocket motor charges was initiated by FSUE FNPC Altai in 1998, and the first nozzle-less test of a first-stage engine was conducted in 1999.
In 1999, the Special Machine-Building Design Bureau of St. Petersburg was brought in to develop technological equipment for loading, storing, and transporting rockets, as well as for experimental testing of launch systems.
Test bench equipment for rocket launch testing was developed by KBSM.
The preliminary design of the 3M-30 Bulava SLBM was ultimately and officially approved by MITT in 2000.
In 1999, RFNC-VNIITF won the competition held to develop the nuclear payload for the Bulava. Its development began in 2000 and was completed in 2001.


Tests:

During the missile's development, a decision was made to abandon traditional test launches from submersible rigs and thus no missile launches were conducted from the Nenoksa test site.
Fire tests of the stages and individual missile components were conducted in full on more than 10 dedicated rigs being to practice missile exits from silos and water.
The ballistic launches of missile mockups were conducted at the 18th Engineering Test Range, belonging to the Special Machine-Building Design Bureau in Yelizavetinka, near St. Petersburg.

Three launches were conducted at the KBSM test site using the SM-E336 ground-based drop test rig, using a full-scale submarine silo. This included, at least, a, but perhaps more than one, launch with a simulated SLBM first-stage engine.
Positive results from ground-based drop tests allowed the transition to surfaced submarine-based tests.
The SM-E330 hydrodynamic rig was used to test the standard under-roof pressurization system under full-scale conditions.
Positive tests results on this rig allowed the transition to surfaced submarine-based launches.

Test launch site of the 3M-30 Bulava with the SM-E336 full-scale test rig. (60°17'33.53" 30°10'51.84")

SM-E366 test rig.

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Production:

The production, involving 620 separate companies, is based at the Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant.

On June 29, 2007, a decision was made to begin serial production.

The missile was originally planned for acceptance into service in 2008, then in 2009, but due to a series of unsuccessful test launches, its acceptance into service was postponed to 2011-2012.

After the successful 13th and 14th launches, joint state tests of the Bulava missile system and the Project 955 SSBN were scheduled to begin by May 2011, with a projected completion by August 2011.
In the event the launches 15th to 18th were to be successful, the missile would be accepted into service by September 2011.
In October 2010, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov stated that the SLBM would be accepted into service after the first launch from the Project 955 SSBN and a follow-up series of 5 test launches.

Starting the 15th launch, all submarine launches were to be carried out by Pr 955 SSBN.
The first of such underwater launch was performed by the Yuri Dolgoruky on June 28, 2011.
In November 2011, it was announced that after a successful two-missile salvo launch, planned for December 2011 the Bulava-M would be accepted into service with the Russian Navy. The salvo was ultimately successfully carried out on December 23, 2011.
In April 2013, two launches of the Bulava from a "commercial batch" of missiles were planned for the year.

On September 6, 2013, the launch from the White Sea to the Kura test site in Kamchatka was aborted two minutes into the flight due to a malfunction in the missile's second-stage nozzle extension mechanism.

Following the failed launch on September 6, 2013, the Russian MoD ordered a series of five consecutive test launches to correct the issues. Regular launches resumed on September 26, 2014 with two salvo launches of two missiles.
Each of these launches however encountered issues.
During the first one, the MIRVs suffered what was described as "an unacceptable dispersion" upon their arrival at the Kura test site. The cause of the issue was reportedly due to damage suffered by the missile at launch.
The second one, the missile detonated on command due to veering off course presumably due to a malfunction in the first-stage solid-propellant rocket motor's controlled nozzle.

Subsequent tests were conducted to evaluate salvo launches (up to 4 missiles) and as part of the acceptance program for the the new Pr955A Borei class SSBN.

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On May 7, 2024, the Bulava was accepted into service by Presidential Decree.

Launcher with a 3M-30 Bulava on the Project 955A, K-553 Generalissimo Suvorov SSBN.

The launcher compartment inside of the Project 955A, K-553 Generalissimo Suvorov SSBN.

Launch equipment:
Dry launch, from a transport and launch cylinder (TPK) using a propellant pressure accumulator/solid rocket motor.
Launch can be performed from underwater or above-water positions.
Launch depth is up to 50-55 meters.

Loading of the transport and launch cylinder on board a Project 955 Borey SSBN.

The naval combat launch complex (KBSK) was developed by Miass, Department 149 of KB-2 GBRC.
The control systems, power supply, computing equipment, and centralized control systems were designed by the 147th Department of KB-2 GBRC.
The geodetic surveying and targeting systems were developed by the 50th Department of KB-2 GBRC, and the defense systems were developed by the 127th Department of KB-2 GBRC.


Ballistic missile range tests were conducted from ground-based rigs at the Special Machine-Building Design Bureau's test site at the 18th Engineering Test Range of the Russian Ministry of Defense in Yelizavetinka near St. Petersburg.

3M-30 Bulava missile :

Three-stage, sequentially arranged rocket.

Hypothetical layout.

Though a few elements are left unknown, the general layout of the 3M-30 rocket consists of:
- 1st stage with a PAD (powder pressure accumulator)
- 2nd stage
- 3rd stage
- MIRV deployment unit (the third stage engine is separated from it once the boost phase is over) with the 3G30 (G-30) platform and the 3L30 (L-30) assembly compartment.

3G30 (G30) - the body of the platform for distributing warheads.


Control and guidance system:

Inertial, with a 3N30 optical-electronic astro-correction unit using an onboard digital computer to generate course correction commands. Makeyev State Research Center is responsible for the developping and manufacturing of the antenna-feeder devices, as well as the hardware and software systems for processing telemetry data.

The control system was developed starting in December 1998 by the N.A. Semikhatov Scientific Production Association of Automatics (Yekaterinburg, Chief Designer - S.F. Deryugin), the command control devices were developed by the N.A. Pilyugin Scientific Production Center for Automatics and Instrument Making (Moscow), and the 3N30 astro-correction system (optical-electronic system) was developed and is being manufactured by Geofizika-Kosmos Scientific Production Enterprise (Moscow). During the development of the control system, it was possible to reduce the weight of the control system by 1.5 times and the weight of the command device complex by 2 times.

Development of the astro-correction system began in 1998. The production capacity for 3N30 astro-correction systems for SLBMs, in 2007-2008, is estimated at around 25 units/year, for a cost of 18.1 million rubles per unit.

The 3N30 OES provides for the formation of an image of navigation stars located in the search zone on the light-sensitive platform of the photo-receiving CCD matrix, its processing and output to the onboard digital control system of measurement information for determining the angular coordinates of the navigation stars in the instrument coordinate system and implementing the astro-correction mode. The control system uses two OES. Each OES includes an optical device, an electronic unit frames and exchange device. To reduce extraneous illumination, a light-shielding device has been developed.


It is believed, though not confirmed, the Bulava-47 missile corrects its flight using the GLONASS satellite navigation system, and also carries warheads with active radar homing heads. However these speculations are not supported by any tangible evidence.


Propulsion systems :
An entirely new generation of composite rocket propellant on an active binder had to be developped for the Bulava-30 sea-based missile system. The task was carried out by the Soyuz Federal Center for Design and Technology.

- PAD (powder pressure accumulator)

- 1 stage - 3D30 solid rocket motor with 5th generation composite propellant. The engine starts after the missile leaves the water or when the missile's departure speed from the launcher decreases to a certain minimum level. The stage operates until the 50th second of flight.
Engine thrust is superior to 90 tons.
Length - 3.8 m
Weight - 18.6 tons

- 2nd stage - 3D60 solid-propellant rocket motor with 5th-generation composite propellant and a sliding nozzle extension. The stage operates from the 50th second of flight to the 90th second of flight.
- 3rd stage - 3D42 solid-propellant rocket engine with 5th generation composite propellant and a sliding nozzle extension. The engine separates from the payload carrying stage after completing its burn. The stage is activated 90 seconds into the flight.
- The warhead separator stage is a multi-chamber solid composite propellant rocket engine. The propellant is low-temperature, with a highly pressure-dependent combustion rate.


Performance characteristics :

Length of the SSBN silo - 12.1 m (START-1 data)
Missile length with warhead section - 12.1 m (START-1 data)
Missile length without warhead section - 11.5 m (START-1 data)
Inner launch container diameter - 2.1 m (START-1 data)
Missile diameter (1st, 2nd and 3rd stages) - 2 m (START-1 data)
Length of 1st stage - 3.8 m (START-1 data)

Weight - 36.8 t (START-1 data)
Weight of 1st stage - 18.6 t (START-1 data)
Throw-in weight - 1150 kg (START-1 data)
Warhead weight (in 6 MIRV configuration) - 95 kg (according to Western data)

Range:
- 5500 km (during testing, White Sea - Kura,Kamchatka)
- 8000 km (according to the project, "Bulava-30")
- 8300 km (according to Western data)
- 9300 km (maximum range launch on 27.08.2011)
Flight time - 14 min (5500 km, during tests, White Sea - Kura, Kamchatka) to 22 min.

Accuracy:
- 350 m (Western data)
- less than 250 m (Russia data)
- 120-150 m (estimated in comparison with Trident-2 and other missiles)
The missile has a flat trajectory with a shortened boost phase. The altitude of the trajectory apogee during tests is 1000 km.


Combat equipment :

RFNC-VNIIT was made responsible with the development of the nuclear payload to be used on the Bulava RK in 1999, which began in 2000 and was completed in 2001. Incidentally, it was carried out in cooperation with the MITT.
Subsequently all Navy missile systems in service have been re-equipped with that newly developed munition, thus lengthening their service life.

On November 1, 2005, the launch of a Topol ICBM from the Kapustin Yar was carried out to flight test the dispensing bus, new missile defense systems penetration countermeasures, and warheads for the Topol-M ICBM and Bulava SLBM.
During the test the warhead (or platform with the warhead) managed to enter a lower flight trajectory and conducted maneuvers.
Their speed was approximately 5.5 km/s.

On April 22, 2006, a second launch in order to test the platform and warhead with the launch of a K65M-R missile from the Kapustin Yar range.
The bus was designed to deliver six MIRVs with the ability to maneuver along a trajectory that complicates the enemy's missile defense missions.

The third test launch was carried out on December 5, 2010, from the Kapustin Yar range, as part of the test program for new warheads.

It is likely that low-yield maneuvering warheads for SLBMs and ICBMs are either in development or undergoing testing.
Control is probably gas-dynamic.
Maneuvering along the course and altitude of flight is carried out in the atmosphere.
However, some information lack clarity and it may very well be possible the claim about maneuvering warheads is not reliable or inaccurate, and what is, instead, being discussed is a maneuvering platform for dispensing warheads.


Warhead configuration options:
- 3M-30 Bulava-30 (tests) - 3 x MIRV;

- 3M-30 "Bulava-30" (standard configuration) - 6 x MIRV developed by VNIITF with a yield of 150 kt each, or 1 maneuvering warhead with a yield of 550-1000 kt;

- "Bulava-30" / "Bulava-47" - 10 x maneuvering MIRV;

- "Bulava-45" / "Bulava-47" - 3 x maneuvering MIRV with a yield of 1-5 kt but reportedly up to 150 kt.

Deployment:

	Total SLBMs	Northern Fleet	Pacific Fleet
2013	16 (96 BB max.)	16 (1 SSBN)	-
2014	32 (192 BB max)	32 (2 SSBNs)	-
2015	48 (288 BB max)	32 (2 SSBNs)	16 (1 SSBN)
2020	64 (384 BB max)	32 (2 SSBNs)	32 (2 SSBNs)
2021	64 (384 BB max)	32 (2 SSBNs)	32 (2 SSBNs)
2022	80 (480 BB max)	32 (2 SSBNs)	48 (3 SSBNs)
2023	96 (576 BB max)	32 (2 SSBNs)	64 (4 SSBNs)

These are meant to be the maximum possible numbers of missiles and warhead; however both can be deployed in smaller quantities.

 

[Ivan le Fou]

Oreshnik (Hazel).

SS-X-31B / SS-X-34
Medium-range ballistic missile developed by the MITT.

So far, very little is known about the system, the little information we have access to are a mixed bag of contradictory statements and speculations.
However, a number of verifiable, factual elements, such as nature, range and capabilities are, though also based on a modicum amount of speculation, relatively established.
Hence, expect a reasonable amount of "it is believed".


It is believed that the theoretical development of the system, codenamed "Kedr", likely began in 2022 or earlier. The missile is being developed using developments from other MITT-developed missile systems, such as the Yars and Bulava.
In July 2023, it is believed Russia's leadership decided to develop a non-nuclear version of the missile based on the RS-26 (SS-X-31) Rubezh ICBM.

According to Western data and based on experience with previous mobile ground-based missile systems, cooperation on the development of this missile system includes:

- Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology - lead developer for the complex and the rocket;
- Federal Scientific and Production Center "Titan-Barricades" (Volgograd) - autonomous launcher and auxiliary vehicles;
- TsNIIAG (Moscow) - development of rocket control system devices;
- FTsDT "Soyuz" - development of the propulsion system;
- OKB "Prozhektor" (Moscow);
- Concern "Sozvezdie" (Voronezh);
- Scientific and Production Enterprise “Spetsenergomekhanika” (Moscow);
- Research Center of Special Equipment and Conversion “Continent” (Moscow).


Missile testing reportedly began with a first launch from the Kapustin Yar test site in October 2023, followed with another one in June 2024.

The third test launch was a combat test: on November 21, 2024, the missile (or missiles) were used against a practical target, namely the Yuzhmash Production Association in Dnepropetrovsk.
Notably it also was the first use of MIRVs in combat.
The payload used is reportedly a new type of MIRV, with a cluster filling (6 x 6 warheads for a total of 36). Though it could also be a set of actual warheads and missile defense system decoys.

Following the November 21's launch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces S. Karakayev proposed accepting The Oreshnik PGRK into service. And on December 18, 2025, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Gerasimov announced that the first brigade equipped with the Oreshnik missile system would be formed in 2025.

A second combat launch got carried out on January 8, 2026. The targets were, reportedly, "critical infrastructures" in or near Lviv.
Though no BDA were made available at this time, the only element available is the range got increased from 800km (first combat launch from Kapustin Yar) to 1500km (from Kapustin Yar).
On December 17, 2025, according to a statement by Belarusian President Lukashenko, the first Oreshnik systems entered combat duty in Belarus.
Satellite image from November 16, 2025, and published on December 27, 2025, reportedly shows the proposed deployment location at the site of the abandoned Krichev-6 airbase.

View attachment 550615

View attachment 550900Layout of facilities on the Krichev-Shesterovka railway line and the territory of the disbanded Krichev airbase.

View attachment 550901
Changes made to the infrastructure of the Krichev airbase as of November 20, 2025.


Based on the experience with similar missile systems entering service with the Russian Armed Forces, it can be assumed with a relative level of certainty that the first division of the Oreshnik system is based at Kapustin Yar.
The Krichev-6 base likely currently houses only one division of the Oreshnik, with 3 to 4 automatic launchers. This could potentially be expanded to a regiment (9 automatic launchers) or a brigade (12 automatic launchers).


Launch and ground equipment : assuming the Oreshnik is based on the Rubezh PGRK, the launcher is probably either made and/or based on the MZKT-79291 chassis, or on one of its modification.

View attachment 550617


The Oreshnik missile.

Missile design : presumably a two-stage solid-fuel missile with a MIRV and a warhead dispersal stage.

View attachment 550618
Oreshnik SS-X-31-B / SS-X-34, based on the RS26 Rubezh.


View attachment 550619
RS-26 Rubezh.



Based on the two videos documenting the operational use of the system, it is believed the missile utilizes a new MIRV design, with each reentry vehicle being equipped with its own control system and engine.

The recovered wreckage of a gas generator system, after the first operational use on November 21, 2024, could therefore either be part of the flight correction system of an individual MIRV.



View attachment 550620


However, it can also refute this assumption and be nothing more than a traditional bus design.


Propulsion systems : cruise engines for all stages of the rocket - solid propellant rocket motors.

Based on pieces of the wreckage recovered, the warhead launch stage is presumably controlled by a multi-nozzle solid propellant engine-gas generator.

View attachment 550621



Initial speculations were the Oreshnik was either a revival of the RS-26, a modification of the RS-26 or an entirely new system based on the RS-26.

However, some of the parts collected on sites, further muddy the water when it comes to what the missile either is or is based on, and tend to open new perspectives.

View attachment 550622

It turns out that part of the engine-gas generator is found in procurement documents for the 3K-30 Bulava complex from 2013. (https://www.tenderguru.ru/tender/10388996)

If accurate, it could imply the Oreshnik shares, hypothetically, commonalities with the submarine launched ballistic missile 3K-30 Bulava. Or, to a broader extent, being a land based version of the Bulava.

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Performance :

Weight at launch - less than or about 40 tons (estimate)
Payload weight- at least 1200 kg (estimate)

Range: 800km - 1500km - with a maximum claimed at 5000 km (as per Ukrainian sources: https://t.me/stranaua/177460)
Maximum speed: 10M (as per Russian claims: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75614) to 11 M (as per Ukrainian claims: https://t.me/DIUkraine/4878)


Warhead :

Based on the two operational uses of the missile, it can be established it carries, or can carry, non-nuclear warheads. However, a nuclear version of the missile's warhead cannot be ruled out in the future.

Based on the launch from November 21, 2024, it is hypothesized the Oreshnik could be fitted with a cluster warhead with 6 groups of 6 warheads each.

View attachment 550625

View attachment 550626


However it could also be theorized the Oreshnik could be fitted with a set of heavy decoys, either based on, or similar to, the 9B899 used on the Iskander-M.

Potentially, the warheads could be equipped with solid propellant rocket motors.

The coating material of the surface of the warheads is believed to allow it to sustain heating temperature up to at least 4000° C.

View attachment 550630


Operational organization of the system:

It is to be believed the Oreshnik missile system division likely operates like any of the already existing mobile IRBM/ICBM structures and therefore presumably includes:

- 3 APU RK "Oreshnik" possibly on the MZKT-79291 chassis.
- Combat duty support vehicle type 15V240M.
View attachment 550627

- Combat control vehicle (command post) type 15V180.
View attachment 550628

View attachment 550629

- Communication vehicle type 15V190.
- Engineering support and camouflage vehicle 15M69M (probably).
- UTM-80M (probably).

Post January 8 observation.

Footage from debris appear to suggest the Oreshnik lacks, or at least he one used on January 8 lacked, individual disengagement pods.

The warhead (cone) likely utilizes the same kind of typical sealed compartment layout and a gas-reactive system for disengaging the warheads.
In such case, each warheads would likely be unguided and carry six "sub"-warheads.

When it comes to the mass of the payload, it could be estimated to be ranging somewhere between 1.250 kg (typical payload for the Topol-M/MR) up to 3.000 kg. With each warhead and cassette being up to about 400 kg.
In that configuration, a range of 4.100km could be achieved.

 

[Ivan le Fou]

Since I mentioned it in an earlier post, I thought I might just as well write a short summary on the R-39UTTH / 3M-91 Bark.

The fact this project was canned before it got completed, in favor of the Bulava, makes things easier.
The 3M-91 Bark (SS-NX-28) is a 3 stages SLBM with intercontinental range and was developed by the Makeyev State Research Center as a replacement for the entire D-19 complex ( R-39 / SS-N-20 Sturgeon SLBM fielded on the Project 941 SSBN).

In the first half of the 1980s a program was launched with the aim of deeply modernizing the R-39, and in November 1985 a resolution by the USSR Council of Ministers ordered to begin experimental design development of the D-19UTTH. The main goal was to surpass the characteristics of the Trident-2 SLBM.
The following year, a new resolution by USSR Council of Ministers adopted the development of the D-19UTTH Bark system to use the R-39UTTH missile.
And finally, by the end of 1986, a resolution adopted the research and development of the D-19UTTH for its deployment on the modernized Pr 941U SSBN.

Preliminary design started in March 1987.
Tests of components and assemblies were conducted on the vacuum-dynamic rig of SKB-385.

Comparative layout of the R39 and R-39UTTH.

Aside from difference in size for the fuel tanks, and the "nose-cone" (which will be addressed later) we can see how differently the payload is organized.
The R-39UTTH goes back to a payload design the Soviet Union had not used since the R27, with the warheads facing up.

R27.

R29.

R39.



The development of the missile was rather uneventful, however the fall of the USSR and the ensuing crisis lead to drastic budget cuts that significantly impacted the speed at which the project could have been developed.
Additionally, another crippling blow dealt to the Bark can be attributed to the fuel used, reducing the missile's output and payload capacity.
Until 1989, funding for the D-19UTTKh complex was provided by the USSR Ministry of General Machine Building, and since 1989 funding were then provided by a state contract with the USSR Ministry of Defense.
It was planned for the Project 941 SSBNs to be completely rearmed with the D-19UTTKh, and in the second half of the 1990s, it was planned to build a series of 14 Project 955 SSBNs with the D-31 complex (12 SLBMs per submarines).

Production of missiles for testing began in 1991 at a rate of 3-5 missiles per year.
By 1992, the entire development of the cruise and auxiliary engines was completed, along with the development of the control system. A total of 14-17 rig fire tests of all engines followed, 7 of which from a submersible. Flight tests of the missile were to be carried out later.
However, funding for the project was significantly reduced, hitting the production capacity relatively hard and thus limiting the production of missile for testing to one every 2 to 3 years.

Work on the engines and fuel started in June 1992.
Preliminary design opted for the equipping of the second and third stages with a fuel similar to that used in the first stage. The main reason behind this decision was due to the conversion of the fuel manufacturer in Ukraine, the Pavlograd Chemical Plant, to the production of household chemicals.
The fuel change reduced the rocket's energy output, thus leading to a reduction of the payload and the number of warheads from 10 to 8.

The test launches were carried out from the test facility at Nenoksa range with the first one taking place in November 1993, the second in December 1994 and the third and final launch, from a ground test facility, on November 19, 1997.
All three launches were unsuccessful, with the third launch having the missile explode after launch, damaging the range buildings.

Missile n°4, modified following the previous test, was ready for testing as of the end of 1997 and its flight was planned for June 1998. Missiles n°5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 were also at various stages of readiness (70-90%) at the at the Zlatoust Machine-Building plant; the main reason being backlog of units and components.
2 launches were planned for 1998 (missiles n°4 and 5).
2 launches in 1999 (missiles n°6 and 7).
5 launches in 200-2001 from the Project 941U Dmitry Donskoy SSBN.
Two converted Pr 941 SSBNs were planned to being equipped with the D-19UTTKh by 2002.
At the time, the system's technical readiness was 73%.
The converted Project 941U SSBN readiness was 83%.
Testing required an additional 3 billion rubles.



In November and December 1997, two Interdepartmental Commissions, including representatives from the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Armaments Directorate of the Russian MoD, and the RVSN were created by order of the Russian MoD.
The general outcome was a harsh criticism of the project, citing outdated solutions for the missile's control system, warheads, propulsion systems, fuel, and other elements.
However, it should be noted that, at the same time, the robustness of the SLBM's control system was superior to that of the Topol-M, the accuracy was virtually identical, the warheads were fully tested, the sophistication of the first- and second-stage propulsion engines exceeded those of the Topol-M by 20% and 25%, respectively, though the third-stage engine was 10% bellow. Furthermore, the missile's mass-production capability was superior to that of the Topol-M.
Thus it was recommended for the testing to continue, in addition to the adoption of two Project 941U SSBNs.

However, the representatives of the Armament Directorate and RVSN established the need for 11 launches in 2006-2007, with an increased cost of 4.5 to 5 billion rubles. It was thus proposed to stop the development of the SLBM, citing, among other reasons:
- development of more unified inter-service missile for the RVSN and the Navy;
- staggered peaks in funding for the rearmament of the RVSN and the Navy;
- cost savings;

The commission's findings were approved in early 1998 by the Military-Technical Council of the Russian MoD and, in the fall of 1998, the Bark was officially shut to be replaced by the Bulava.


Design:

Overall, the design is relatively similar to the R-39/SS-N-20. Three sustainment stages, a warhead deployment stage, the warheads themselves with MDS, an instrument compartment, and a payload fairing.
The sealed instrument compartment is located in the forward section and is divided into two parts:
-a compartment housing a three-stage gyrostabilizer with an astrovision device covered by a permanent dome-shaped window,
-a compartment housing the control system instruments, mounted on a shock-absorbing frame.
The warheads are located around the instrument compartment, with the MDS located next to them.


However, and that is what makes that missile so interesting in my opinion, what differentiates the Bark from the Sturgeon was the use of a new element: an aerodynamic carbon fiber fairing with a flexible, conical, inflatable 1.7m long nozzle.

The Bark was larger in both length and diameter and was equipped with an ice-breaking system for launches from under ice.


Performance characteristics :
Length - 16.1 m
Diameter - 2.42 m

Weight:
- not less than 70,000 kg
- 87,000 kg (loading weight)
Throw-in weight - 3,050 kg
ARSS weight - 6,000 kg

Range:
- 9,000-10,000 km

CEP:
- 125 - 300 m (presumably)


Warhead:

-R-39UTTH / 3M-91 "Bark-Ost" - 10-8 x ballistic high-speed, medium-capacity MIRVs (200 kt).
The warheads are made with reduced visibility in the radar and infrared ranges.
According to the international agreement of November 15, 1990, the D-19UTTKh was to be equipped with 8 MIRVs, which would ensure non-violation of international agreements on the reduction of strategic nuclear forces. The missile was equipped with a MBM countermeasures system.

-R-39UTTH / 3M-91 "Bark-West" - one single maneuvering high-speed warhead.


Modifications :

-R-39UTTH / 3M-91 "Bark-Ost" - intercontinental SLBM with MIRVs.

-The R-39UTTH/3M-91 "Bark-West" - intercontinental SLBM with a single-warhead.


Launch vehicles :

- PS-65M submersible launch system.
Supposed to use a submersible test stand at the Balaklava range. However, to this day, the use of the PS-65M in missile tests has not been confirmed.

- Experimental Project 619.
Supposed to use an experimental SSBN for testing the D-19UTTKh complex.

- SSBN Pr 941U.
At the time the Bark project was shut down, the readiness of the Project 941U Dmitry Donskoy was estimated to be around 84%, with all of the launchers mounted, only the ship's systems were not installed.

- SSBN Pr 955 Borei.
In 1998, the development of SSBNs for the Bark complex was stopped, the boat was redesigned for the Bulava.

 

[Ivan le Fou]

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[Ivan le Fou]

Post January 8 observation.

Footage from debris appear to suggest the Oreshnik lacks, or at least he one used on January 8 lacked, individual disengagement pods.

The warhead (cone) likely utilizes the same kind of typical sealed compartment layout and a gas-reactive system for disengaging the warheads.
In such case, each warheads would likely be unguided and carry six "sub"-warheads.

When it comes to the mass of the payload, it could be estimated to be ranging somewhere between 1.250 kg (typical payload for the Topol-M/MR) up to 3.000 kg. With each warhead and cassette being up to about 400 kg.
In that configuration, a range of 4.100km could be achieved.

Overall observation regarding the current tracking history of the Oreshnik.

The complex being new and having not displayed the same level of scrutiny as all of the others, be them related to the RVSN or any kind of weapon system in use by Russia's armed forces (or even any country for that matter), it is interesting to note none of the usual and proper tests have been conducted.


Test launches carried out by the Rocket Forces are notoriously advertised and studied by foreign and domestic observers. The testing of such weapons is, after all, impossible to conceal or to carry out in secret.

Every system that later joined the arsenal of the RVSN and submarine forces had to go through extensive trials focusing on the various aspects of the missile: propulsion, guidance, accuracy, dispersion of the payload. The newer the system is, the more extensive the tests are.
Though unknown in number and nature, it is apparent the Orechnik presents a number of innovations, and, just like for any of the other systems, they would require testing and evaluation.

The fact none of them were reported and/or documented could lead to suggest the two launches that have taken place, so far, could have been, potentially, test launches carried out in actual operational context.


For illustrative purpose:

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