Warfare We need to talk about the vulnerability of stationary facilities

[muck]

It's easy to brush off the Russian and Iranian militaries as incompetent, but the past two weeks represent a final warning with regard to a lesson we should've learned three years ago (if not before). Ukraine's Operation "Spider's Web" and Israel's Operation "Rising Lion" must both be characterised as superior intelligence work delivering a fatal blow to strategic targets in Russia and Iran. In other words: in two police states geared for war.

How could Western constitutional states not geared for war possibly hope to stave off such a crippling opening blow? The answer seems to be: They couldn't. From a European perspective, we're talking about rearming and preparing for modern warfare with all its novel inventions; but I see very little talk of new bunkers, hardened infrastructure, air defences for stationary facilities, and so on.

Heck, there's not a single air base in Europe (including American ones, by the way) with provisions in place to shoot down FPV drones. There's not a single military facility with provisions in place to detect and engage ATGM teams like the ones deployed by Mossad last night against Iran's air defences.

A large number of our air bases don't even have enough hardened shelters, as the reductions and cost-cuts of the past three decades often saw air power concentrated on a handful of (now very crowded) air bases. And at this point, we haven't even talked about crucial civilian sites like power plants and weapons manufacturers yet. The last two weeks must be a call to spring into action.

 

[Fluff]

It's easy to brush off the Russian and Iranian militaries as incompetent, but the past two weeks represent a final warning with regard to a lesson we should've learned three years ago (if not before). Ukraine's Operation "Spider's Web" and Israel's Operation "Rising Lion" must both be characterised as superior intelligence work delivering a fatal blow to strategic targets in Russia and Iran. In other words: in two police states geared for war.

How could Western constitutional states not geared for war possibly hope to stave off such a crippling opening blow? The answer seems to be: They couldn't. From a European perspective, we're talking about rearming and preparing for modern warfare with all its novel inventions; but I see very little talk of new bunkers, hardened infrastructure, air defences for stationary facilities, and so on.

Heck, there's not a single air base in Europe (including American ones, by the way) with provisions in place to shoot down FPV drones. There's not a single military facility with provisions in place to detect and engage ATGM teams like the ones deployed by Mossad last night against Iran's air defences.

A large number of our air bases don't even have enough hardened shelters, as the reductions and cost-cuts of the past three decades often saw air power concentrated on a handful of (now very crowded) air bases. And at this point, we haven't even talked about crucial civilian sites like power plants and weapons manufacturers yet. The last two weeks must be a call to spring into action.

The first defense, in theory, is that europe isn’t talking about nuking anyone, or wiping another country from the face of the earth. Of course there could be a nation, or organisation that wishes us Ill.

2nd defense is that 2 countries have nukes. Somewhat clashes with my first point, but there you go.

Should we get close to a war, then yes point defenses would be a good idea. Biggest problem is how long the list is, of things to defend.

You protect a power station, but what about the distribution network. The workers come over a bridge, do you defend this? Or the rail line bringing coal. Or the train depot. Or the cafe the train drivers use for breakfast.

But still yes, we should have 500 shorad trucks in each large nato country, so if one country gets threatened, we could send 2000 trucks.

The overall lesson I’m seeing is to avoid a war.

 

[muck]

@Fluff: We only need to go back 35 years to look what needs to be done (in principle).

 

[Chazman]

We are definitely not prepared. Probably no one is. And it will take a combination of strategies and weapons both kinetic and non-kinetic.

 

[Flagg]

Fiber optic UAS can now reach 20km across the zero line into adversary depth. All in an exceptionally small and cheap form factor.

At the moment, they are largely jamproof, but countermeasures to them are high priority.

Hard kill(such as interceptor drones) is an option but not easy, cheap, or ready for prime time.

Throwing rounds around western air bases often in proximity to population is a no go.

Soft kill(lasers to kill sensors) is an option, but has its limitations.

It’s a vulnerability that will not be easily remedied.

Mobile network piggybacking is also a threat for running FPV drones and also not easily disrupted unless you can justify a black hole for local commercial spectrum.

Offense is currently cheap, easy to build, and easy to win

Defence is currently expensive, hard to build, and hard to win,

 

[Hiryu2.0]

Latvia Bans Russian and Belarusian Citizens from Working in Critical Infrastructure

New legislation in Latvia restricts employment and services for Russian and Belarusian nationals in essential public infrastructure sectors.

united24media.com

 

[Fluff]

We are definitely not prepared. Probably no one is. And it will take a combination of strategies and weapons both kinetic and non-kinetic.

Military bases should have protection running 24/7 now. Power plants, train stations etc would be ideal for reservists etc. But you would need to buy the kit now, and train them to use it. I dont think you could be 100% but ignoring it is going to make it happen, doing something is going to steer the opponent away from this type of attack.

And of course for nuclear states, if you did decapitate their military, you run the risk of waking up to instant sunshine, so there is that.