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Mil News Australia, NZ, Oceania Military News

So Australia paid the first 500 million...but...


Maybe not asking for too many modifications might help deliveries. If the Aussies had ordered a nuclear sub straight away instead of asking for power plant to be replaced by a diesel, some subs might be under Australian flag already.
 
After the previous experience with French submarine making, I doubt there will be any opportunity for such a thing again for a very long time. If the Virginia's for some reason don't pan out, the RAN is more likely to jump straight to the British made subs.
 
The US Department of State has approved a potential sale of new AIM-120C and AIM-120D Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs) to Australia under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme.

The approval of the potential sale follows a request from the Australian government to buy up to 200 AIM-120C-8 AMRAAMs and up to 200 AIM-120D-3 AMRAAMs, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) said on 9 April. The possible deal, which includes support and related equipment, has an estimated value of $1.04 billion.
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New Zealand will ramp up defence spending under a major military overhaul unveiled Monday, pouring billions of dollars into missiles, cyber security and drones.

Prime Minister Christopher Luxon said it was time for New Zealand to "pull its weight", vowing to lift defence spending from one percent of GDP to more than two percent within the next 10 years.

The NZ$9 billion (US$5 billion) plan would also see New Zealand's military work more closely with key regional ally Australia, Luxon said.

"Global tensions are increasing rapidly, and New Zealand has stepped up on the world stage, but our current defence spending is simply too low."

Priority areas included "enhanced strike capabilities", long-range drones, cyber security and border surveillance.

New Zealand is a member of the "Five Eyes" intelligence-sharing alliance alongside the United States, Britain, Canada, and Australia.

But it has been criticised over the years for taking a softer line on China -- putting its trading relationship ahead of its allies' security concerns.
https://www.barrons.com/news/new-zealand-unveils-major-military-overhaul-e109335a
 
NZ to retire RNZN Sea Sprite helicopters - hopefully in favour of new build SH-60's but I guess that in no small part will depend on what platforms they'll have to operate from. Unfortunately the naval NH-90 is a more likely replacement.

 
Australia still has some 40ish NH90 stored somewhere, right?. Wouldn't be surprised if they finally can get rid of some of them. At least perhaps those who were operated by the Navy? Or are those regular NH90s?
 
Australia still has some 40ish NH90 stored somewhere, right?. Wouldn't be surprised if they finally can get rid of some of them. At least perhaps those who were operated by the Navy? Or are those regular NH90s?
They are partially stripped and in various conditions. None are flightworthy
 
I thought they were cut up and buried?
 
I thought they were cut up and buried?
Some have been apparently but some are partially stripped for the sale of parts...avionics, engines etc. The only ones buried are those with nothing left to be sold
 
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I heard that NH Industries would like to buy back some of them after the sale to the UK did not happen.
 
Nothing much has changed since I left the navy in 1986, same issues and problems
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Australia’s strategic environment is more threatening than it has been since World War II. Despite public recognition of heightened threats and a declaration of ambitious strategic goals, the government’s defence funding and preparedness efforts fall short of what is urgently needed.

The National Defence Strategy released last year sets out a clear vision: a strategy of denial aimed at persuading adversaries that attacking Australia wouldn’t be worthwhile. It focuses on defending our northern approaches. This strategy requires a force that is not only technologically advanced but also ready and able to operate effectively right now.

ASPI’s report The Cost of Defence 2025-26, released on Thursday, highlights a worrying disconnect. Most major capability acquisitions for the Australian Defence Force – including the nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS partnership and a planned class of frigates – are scheduled for delivery well into the 2030s and beyond.

While these future capabilities are critical for long-term deterrence, they provide little immediate enhancement of our defence capability, preparedness or resilience. For the next few years, we’re left with a paper ADF that lacks the readiness and size to meet near-term threats.

The report also notes funding priorities heavily favour future acquisitions at the expense of maintaining and sustaining today’s force. Personnel shortages, limited munitions stocks and ageing infrastructure exacerbate this problem. Without rapid moves to acquire critical equipment such as integrated air and missile defence systems, long-range strike munitions, autonomous systems and weapons for knocking down cheap drones, the ADF risks being ill-prepared for current and emerging threats in the Indo-Pacific.

Apart from funding, the Defence Department faces serious internal hurdles that hinder its ability to deliver on strategic goals. Ten years after the 2015 First Principles Review, which aimed to simplify complex structures and improve accountability, Defence remains overly bureaucratic and risk-averse. Instead of streamlining, the department has added senior leadership layers, complicating decision-making and slowing procurement.

And the government still has not cleared obstacles in achieving an interagency, intergovernmental and whole-of-nation effort to prepare the country for potential crises and to build resilience into our economy and society.

Workforce shortages are another severe problem. The ADF has struggled with recruitment and retention, especially for personnel with science and technology skills vital for managing modern military systems and complex acquisition projects. Because mid-rank personnel are leaving the services so fast, the force is becoming hollow and less capable of sustaining operations.

Efforts to integrate permanent and reserve forces face cultural and logistic problems, and there is a growing shortage of skills in such areas as cyber security, acquisition management and engineering.

Cultural reforms aimed at fostering an inclusive and effective working environment have met limited success. Persistent issues around leadership consistency, workplace harassment and morale remain, and they in turn affect retention and operational readiness.

Australia’s defence industry is small, fragmented and struggling to keep pace with changing strategic demands. The 2024 Defence Industry Development Strategy aims to build a domestic defence industrial base that is more capable, resilient and innovative.

But our analysis reveals that industry faces great capacity and workforce shortages, particularly in engineering and technical trades. The cyclic nature of demand from the ADF, worsened by frequent reviews and shifting priorities, creates financial instability for companies and discourages private investment.

Australian defence procurement processes are often slow and risk-averse, limiting opportunities for small and medium enterprises and stifling innovation.

Defence is struggling to achieve a balance between achieving independent production capability and integrating with international partners (especially through AUKUS).

A particularly pressing concern is the slow progress of the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise, intended to achieve much greater domestic munitions production.

The inability to rapidly produce and replenish munitions leaves Australia vulnerable to supply chain disruptions in times of conflict.

Our report makes clear that Australia stands at a critical juncture. The government’s rhetoric about a once-in-a-generation defence investment is not matched by funding levels or organisational reform.

The budget is a lost opportunity to prepare the ADF for near-term crises and to build a resilient defence industrial base.

Australia’s strategic environment demands a defence posture that is agile, ready and credible – now, not just decades in the future. Our report provides a sobering assessment.

The government and Defence face a complex task. Meeting these challenges requires not only more resources but a cultural and structural shift towards efficiency, transparency and urgency. If Australia is to deter aggression, maintain its sovereignty and protect its interests in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific, the time to act is now.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/n...ation Australias defence build-up is too slow
 
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The Five Eyes are really four eyes and a wink, according to a joke that derides New Zealand’s limited defence spending. Publication of the country’s 2025 Defence Capability Plan (DCP) may result in the saying being heard a bit less often.

The policy document, issued on 7 April 2025, commits to increase defence spending and emphasises New Zealand’s international defence partnerships.

Defence Minister Judith Collins opened the DCP by writing:

Our approach deliberately focuses on what we can and must do to re-build the [New Zealand Defence Force] and invest wisely in critical capability to ensure we are combat-capable, interoperable, and ready to be of use wherever we are needed.
The NZ$12 billion commitment over the next four years will lift defence spending from just over 1 percent of GDP to more than 2 percent for the first time since the early 1990s. It sank as low as 0.99 percent in 2015.

The money will pay for enhanced strike capabilities, an anti-tank missile upgrade, life extension of the frigates, uncrewed boats and aircraft, systems for shooting down cheap drones, cyber and space capabilities and ground vehicles. In addition, funding has been allocated for improved intelligence, digital modernisation, enhanced information management and infrastructure upgrades.

New Zealand has long been accused of strategic apathy. But the DCP’s contents and the delay in its release as the government reassessed risk indicate a change in course. The document accepts that the nation ‘is facing its most challenging and dangerous strategic environment for decades’ against a backdrop of concerns about the United States withdrawing from the Asia-Pacific.

Public opinion has shifted in the same direction as the political outlook. A March RNZ-Reid Research Poll found 50.3 percent of respondents in favour of increasing defence spending, with only 31.9 percent against. US President Donald Trump complains that international partners spend too little on defence; the DCP should help redress this in New Zealand’s case. It should also diminish perceptions that New Zealand has been freeriding on Australia.

Aside from the commitment to enhancing the NZDF’s capability, the DCP is notable for its emphasis on international cooperation. Described as a foreign policy reset, the government of Prime Minister Christopher Luxon has consistently emphasised the importance of partnerships, including referencing the ANZUS Treaty and offering public backing for the Five Eyes intelligence network. While concerns have been raised that deepening defence ties with Australia and the US may compromise New Zealand’s independent foreign policy, partnership is central to the nation’s approach to defence.

New Zealand has frequently sought to make worthwhile contributions to coalition efforts. It has pledged to promote enhanced shared awareness and information management in the DCP, as well as ‘maintain credible, combat-capable forces’ that can operate independently and in cooperation with multinational partners. This includes ensuring special forces are interoperable with Five Eyes partners and committing NZDF frigates to making ‘meaningful contributions’ to global maritime security.

Renewed emphasis has been placed on the trans-Tasman defence relationship, including the requirement for a ‘more greatly integrated ANZAC force’. The DCP reinforced the intent of a 2024 Australia-New Zealand joint statement that committed to closer defence relations by enhancing interoperability and defence industry collaboration and reaffirmed support for the maintenance of the global rules-based order and Pacific sovereign security. The overall intention is to ensure that New Zealand is ‘more integrated’ with Australia, thereby making ‘both countries stronger together’.

Although the DCP did not address bilateral cooperation directly, the ongoing significance of New Zealand’s defence relationship with the US was implicit in its references to the Five Eyes relationship. Defence ties have burgeoned as the long shadow of the 1985 crisis, in which the US suspended its ANZUS alliance obligations to New Zealand, has receded, and it is not unreasonable to conclude that the US is one of New Zealand’s unnamed ‘closest international security partners’ referenced in the DCP, suggesting that ongoing cooperation will remain essential.

The DCP mentioned security relationships beyond the Five Eyes and, Australia specifically, including those with Indo-Pacific partners, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the partners in the Five Power Defence Arrangements. The relationship with Pacific Island countries is particularly important, with a commitment to deepen defence ‘engagement and cooperation’.

Despite the centrality of partnerships within the DCP, they may prove to be significant in a way that went unwritten. New Zealand’s defence relationship with Australia, Britain and the US has faced public scrutiny since the announcement of AUKUS, because the country was not invited to join. More recently, over the past two years, there has been significant debate about whether New Zealand should consider joining AUKUS Pillar Two, the part of the security partnership covering technologies other than nuclear submarines. While New Zealand has so far hesitated to take that step, it has been suggested that an uplift in defence spending, while required to enhance the capability of the NZDF, was also a necessary precursor to joining Pillar Two.

The DCP affirmed New Zealand’s position as a committed member of the Five Eyes, with its gaze fixed firmly on multinational cooperation to safeguard domestic and international security. Whether that commitment extends to membership of AUKUS Pillar Two remains to be seen.
 
The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Australia of F/A-18F and EA-18G Sustainment Support and related equipment for an estimated cost of $2.0 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today.

The Government of Australia has requested to buy the following equipment and services related to sustainment of its F/A-18F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler aircraft fleet: sixty (60) Global Lightning – Joint Tactical Terminal – Transceivers (JTT-X); forty (40) Advanced Electronic Warfare systems; and twenty-four (24) Next Generation Electronic Attack Units (NGEAU). The following non-MDE items will also be included: AN/PYQ-10C Simple Key Loaders; Inline Network Encryptors; AN/ALE-47 electronic warfare countermeasures systems (common carriage); Joint Mission Planning System (JMPS) software; aircraft spares and repair parts; other support equipment; software and hardware updates and development; system configuration upgrades; avionics software support; aircraft armament equipment; Foreign Liaison Officer support; technical data; engineering change proposals; engine component improvements; training and training equipment; training aids, devices, and spares; flight test services; transportation costs; system integration and testing; software development and integration; tools and test equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $2.0 billion.
https://www.dsca.mil/Press-Media/Ma...stralia-fa-18f-and-ea-18g-sustainment-support
 

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