Article TET 1968

Frisco-Kid · Jul 11, 2004

I'll be standing by for the other installments, RW. You're a very knowledgable, informative writer. I've never read one book about the war and didn't pay too much attention about the politics of it. Has left me pretty ignorant in some respects. It's only been the last couple years that I've started picking up bits of it; just enough to piss me off at some of the incompetency, stupidity, and arrogance of the people pulling the strings. Looking forward to more info, Bro.

Bombardier · Jul 11, 2004

Wow, You DA Man rotorwash, Im really looking forward to more of the same. Thank you :mrgreen:

Zofo · Jul 11, 2004

Fascinating stuff, I look forward to reading the next installments!

rotorwash · Jul 11, 2004

Frisco, your'e right about the stupidity, incompetence and arrogance. It angered me for a lot of years until I started reading to see if some of the CW was accurate. The more I read the more I shook my head, then laughed, then cried.

RW

rotorwash · Apr 2, 2005

In my earlier post about TET 68, I mentioned that the North Vietnamese correctly assessed the media reaction as one of the planning features of the attack. I have since read information that convincingly proves this was not the case.

From the North Vietnamese perspective, TET started in early 1967 at a high level meeting of the North Vietnamese Central Committee. The way they saw it, the war had progressed from the first stage, insurgency, to the second stage, a combination of conventional and guerrilla warfare that, so far, had been disappointing. Many top leaders, including Giap and General Nguyen Chi Thanh, Westmoreland’s counterpart on the Communist side, were urging negotiation. But Giap was a good soldier and Thanh was seriously wounded in a B-52 raid and died in July, 1967. Faced with the prospect of losing the war in the South, the Politburo concluded that it was now time for a spontaneous uprising that would decide the war in a very short time. This would come to be called “General Offensive, General Uprising,” or in its Vietnamese acronym, TCK-TKN. The offensive would involve many preliminary attacks to draw Allied forces away from the main target areas, setting the stage for the main thrust the world would know as Tet. One analysis of the Hanoi Politburo of the time stated that the Marxist mind set had became their reality, in short, they believed their own propaganda. At the core of this reality was the conviction that the Americans would retreat behind barbed wire and the ARVN would simply run. The “Uprising” part of the plan was the belief that the people of the South would unite with the attacking forces against the Allies. The great dreamed of upheaval of the masses, in the Politburo’s minds, was irresistible. The Politburo even presented a poem written by Ho Chi Minh commemorating the victory not yet achieved.

Overall responsibility for the operation was given to the legendary General Vo Nguyen Giap. As he began the planning process, he made his own fundamental mistake. Dusting off his old Dien Bien Phu plans, he looked at Khe Sanh and seeing similar tactical opportunities, envisioned a repeat performance.

As the monsoons ended, the offensive began with “repositioning” attacks designed to get Allied maneuver units positioned where Giap wanted them. Probing attacks began in the Central Highlands and along the Cambodian border. In October the NVA struck at Song Be and Main Force VC units attacked Loc Ninh. In both cases the attacks were failures and at Loc Ninh, the VC losses were staggering. In November several NVA regiments moved east out of Cambodia and ran into US and ARVN units at Dak To. Captured documents revealed the goal had been to destroy a major US unit to draw additional troops to the Western Highlands. The attack was a dismal failure and the battered NVA retreated back to Cambodia.

The next stage was the attack on Khe Sanh. Giap hoped to pull troops away from the cities, then after the cities were attacked, Allied strength would be so dissipated that he could get his set piece battle, his Dien Bien Phu replay. Giap committed most of four divisions - about 40,000 men - and lost almost 10,000, mostly to American airpower and artillery. NVA units lost ten men for every American, some NVA units taking 90 percent casualties.

An offensive of this magnitude took months of staff planning. Weapons and food caches were pre-positioned, radio operating procedures were established, approach routes and assembly areas were carefully planned, and areas of responsibility and unit boundaries carefully established. To set all of this in motion, orders and map overlays were hand carried down the chain of command. Politburo member Lt. General Tran Van Tra himself carried the orders from Hanoi to South Viet Nam.

Inevitably things that can go wrong will go wrong and this operation was no exception. The Allies began picking up bits and pieces that something big was in the wind. NVA and VC forces celebrated Tet three days early, obviously they would be busy on the real Tet. Lists of radio frequencies were captured, even though they had been typed on onion skin so they could be swallowed easily if need be. An entire map of the movement routes and assembly areas for the Saigon area was captured, but because many of the indicated assembly areas were now cleared of trees, and the map showed them as forested, it was decided the map was old and out of date. It wasn’t until groups of NVA were observed sitting forlornly in the open at the exact locations indicated on the map that the map’s true value was realized. Electronic sensors were airdropped over many likely approach routes, monitored from the air they indicated heavy traffic moving into South Viet Nam.

The major attack was set for the morning of January 30, but at the last minute, for reasons still unknown, the attack was delayed for twenty four hours. Feverishly word went out, but not surprisingly, someone got overlooked. Early in the morning of January 30, Nha Trang and five other towns in northern South Viet Nam were attacked, all of the attacks failed.

Now the secret was out and American forces went on alert canceling the official Tet cease fire. Ominous things began to happen. For example, many of the Vietnamese that worked for the Allies did not show up for work and those that did had evaporated by sundown on the 30th. The Allies were not sitting still, fifteen infantry battalions were repositioned closer to Saigon, fifteen more were repositioned to support other potential targets and the perimeter at Bien Hoa Airbase was reinforced with a battalion of engineers.

Thirty minutes after midnight, Tuesday morning, January 31, 119 targets were attacked and by the end of the day a hundred had failed. Several more attacks had been foiled because of the heightened alert status caused by the premature attacks the previous night. Only in a few cities - most notably Saigon and Hue - did the NVA have a toehold. In the majority of instances the attacks went forward exactly as planned, although there were some unforseen events like a weapons cache in Saigon that had been invaded by termites, rendering the weapons useless.

Romantics envisioned General Giap directing his troops from a hidden tunnel in the mountains, but in fact he was in Hanoi anxiously waiting for word of the “general uprising” so vividly anticipated. When word finally started filtering up the chain of command, it was not encouraging. The Americans had not recoiled in horror at the ferocity of the attacks, instead they had counter-attacked with equal or increased ferocity. Attacks designed to destroy Allied aircraft on the ground had been the most notable failures, American air assets were as active as before. The ARVN did not run away, but fought stubbornly, although there were instances where an American advisor had to step in and take command, and one situation where a division commander was discovered to have civilian clothes on under his uniform. But thousands of ARVN soldiers that had been with their families on Tet leave conducted themselves admirably, and the ARVN 1st Infantry Division in Hue was hanging on to a small corner of the Citadel against far superior numbers of NVA. Even the civilian uprising did not happen, instead militia of the RF-PF defended their villages with a tenacity that was shocking.

The fighting in Saigon lasted over the next two weeks and the battle for Hue, the last gasp of the offensive, went on until the twenty-fifth of February, although the NVA ground commander had asked permission to withdraw just a few days into the battle. His concerns about being cut off and surrounded were well founded, but permission was refused. The Politburo was in a state of shock. How could they have miscalculated so badly? Recriminations and pointed questions, unheard of in a Communist state, began leaking out. The words of the dead General Nguyen Chi Thanh resounded, pointing straight at Giap’s dreams of another Dien Bien Phu, “To repeat exactly what belongs to history in the face of a new reality is adventurism, if we fight the Americans in accordance with modern military tactics, we will be badly battered by them. We must fight the enemy as we would fight a tiger as he leaps at his prey.”

In 1982, General Tran Van Tra, in his published memoirs, wrote, “During Tet of 1968 we did not correctly evaluate the specific balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy, did not fully realize that the enemy still had considerable capabilities and that our capabilities were limited.” His memoirs were banned in Hanoi soon after they were published and he disappeared a short time later.

Maj. General Tran Do, deputy commander of the NVA and VC forces in South Viet Nam was critical of the attack on the U.S. Embassy and asked why those who planned the assault failed to consider the ease with which helicopters and airborne troops could be landed on the roof, which was exactly what happened. He inquired, “Was there an error in planning?”

As one veteran VC commander put it, the losses sustained by the VC and NVA were “agonizing and irreplaceable.” Dead in the forefront of the attack were local VC and NVA who had gone north as early as 1954 and infiltrated back to their home areas. VC and NVA died - quite literally - by the thousands, not only front line soldiers, but also the all-important political cadres. These leaders who had been long hidden - and long sought after by the Allies - emerged expecting the “general uprising” and ended up dead, many laid out on the lawns of district capitals they had anticipated controlling. The vital political infrastructure that had taken so long to build - some of it started in 1954 - was a shambles and would never be rebuilt. VC units never recovered and were usually filled out by NVA and designated Popular Liberation Front, but they still were not the threat they previously had been. In the end, at the cost of enormous casualties, the Communists achieved nothing but the loss of their best and brightest.

Coming soon - the media perspective on Tet.

Rotorwash

Zofo · Apr 3, 2005

I didn't know anything about Tet other than it was a defeat for the US! I guess that'll be your media installment coming up to confirm?

Full Metal Jacket dealt with Hue I think towards the end of the film and that didn't look overly optimistic either.

A very concise post this; full of interesting detail and historical perspective; not one sided and worthy of a historian. Lots more please. (I can also write the puff on the dust cover your new book too!)sal;

rotorwash · Apr 3, 2005

Thanks Zofo, I'll take the puff on the dust cover.

Full Metal Jacket didn't have much historical accuracy about it. Their version of Hue looked more like Stalingrad. There wasn't a building in Hue more then two stories tall, and there certainly wasn't an industrial district.

RW

Zofo · Apr 3, 2005

Thanks for the pointer towards Hue / Stalingrad! I had no idea about what the situation was on the ground there - this I think is the problem for amateur historians or those who have a general interest in such topics. If a "historical" film, claiming to show what happened (or even a dramatic representation of it) is off beam in terms of setting, location and veracity, then where does that leave the interested parties? Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? so to speak!

Frisco-Kid · Apr 5, 2005

RW: Jeez, it's about time you got back to this

. Very good, my friend. Your pupils are lucky to have you. Looking forward to the rest.

ZOFO: This will unfold as RW continues with his installments....Tet '68 wasn't the US defeat that the media presented. It did catch us off guard, but we regrouped and came back at them with a vengeance. That's how I ended up doing a second tour. Like RW has illustrated, the backbone of the VC was broken; never to recover. Most of their objectives were never captured and none of them were held. They bloodied our noses, but we broke bones.

rotorwash · Apr 9, 2005

Tet according to the Media

The following is copyrighted, excerpted from a book I am writing of the same name.

Legacy of Hype

Military vs Media

In the middle of February I came back to the States for a thirty day leave. The fighting around Saigon had wound down, the battle for Hue was still raging and Khe Sanh was still under siege. When people found out I had “survived” Tet, they treated me like I was some kind of walking miracle, like I had lived through the Mummy’s curse, brain cancer, the wrath of my seventh grade English teacher and the fires of Hell all at the same time. I was appalled at the way the news media was treating the fighting. Tales of heavy fighting and dead civilians punctuated by scenes of American casualties were the normal fare and were presented in the somber tones reserved for lasting defeat. Victories like we had accomplished at Quang Ngai were ignored or reported with just enough sarcasm to imply that the military was lying “again.” I could not comprehend how a situation I knew to compare favorably with the Battle of the Bulge was being reported as Custer’s Last Stand. I was furious at the misrepresentation and have spent a lot of time since then trying to figure out why it occurred.

I have finally concluded that, generally speaking, the media had no idea how the military evaluated a battle, and the military had no idea how the media was committed to getting compelling examples of mayhem on the evening news. In a manner reminiscent of a married couple that speak two different languages, Tet brought this situational misunderstanding to a head. Like a good counselor I will attempt to explain the positions of the each side, who must remain together for the sake of the children.

Winning a guerilla war is not like winning any other war. You cannot look at a blue line progressively pushing a red line off the map and conclude you are winning. This type of war is attrition, plain and simple. You know you are winning when it becomes more difficult for the enemy to hit you, and when he does, it causes less damage. Let me use our situation at Duc Pho as an example. When we first went in, as I have related in other stories, we were sniped at from within our own perimeter, shot at as we flew in our landing patterns and some of our most interesting firefights were while refueling. We were mortared so often we were nicknamed “mortar mountain.” Every village we took was a fortress requiring siege tactics. As time went on we pushed Charley out of his sniping positions and away from our perimeter, and as we pushed Charley out, the civilians moved in closer to Duc Pho because we represented protection. We could drive in beautiful downtown Duc Pho and take our laundry to the orphanage. This did not mean that he would still sneak into villages at night and assassinate civilians. By the time of Tet, we had to travel far and wide to find a VC worthy of the name. We would still get mortared occasionally, but it was less frequently and with fewer rounds and less accuracy. After Tet, the attacks really dropped off. Interviews with prisoners explained why. Mortar rounds would have to be carried from the mountains three or four at a time. When they got orders for an attack, the tube would be brought out and the rounds fired off. Several times we destroyed the tube, which would require a replacement carried in. When the mortar team came in to use the mortar, they would have to start from the mountains after dark to avoid dusk patrols by our gunships or artillery spotters. Then they would run all night, set up the tube, fire, hide the tube again and run back to the mountains, trying to get out from under our artillery fan by first light and into hiding before gunship dawn patrols. All the time being wary of ambushes and not at all certain of the loyalty of the villages they had to pass by. Finally they gave up on mortars altogether and started using rockets that they could fire from the mountains. Then Duc Pho became known as the “rocket pocket.”

These kinds of victory conditions are slow to develop to an untrained eye, far too slow for the evening news, who could have images shot in the morning on the evening news while I waited six weeks for a replacement window for a pilot’s door.

Unfortunately, nobody in the government articulated that these were the conditions by which you measure victory in this type of war. In fact, nothing in the way of what was necessary for victory was articulated by our government. Even GI’s couldn’t understand why you took a hill and then walked away from it only to have to retake it at a later date. They, and the press did not understand that if you occupied territory for any length of time you set yourself up as a target, you must remain mobile to beat guerillas.

This strategic vacuum allowed the press to define victory conditions in terms they understood, and if they didn’t think we were meeting them, then, quite simply, we were losing the war. Body count was the biggie. Body count has been done since battles were first fought, not to determine who won and who lost, but just as a simple, important piece of information about the battle. This, however, turned out to be a handle that the media could grasp, so they did. With both hands in a death grip, unfortunately the grip was not on reality. The military, who had the job of fighting wars, not dealing with media, soon got caught up in this and it took on a far more important meaning then it should have. Shortly before Tet, Westmoreland made his famous “light at the end of tunnel” speech. With accurately defined victory conditions, he was absolutely right. But then Tet happened and the body count went berserk, therefore, we lost. Look at the current war in Iraq, on many days the only news is how many Americans were lost today. One American commander recently complained that it was easier to get Al Jazzera and other Arab news agencies to report on the opening of a new school or hospital then it was to get the Western media to show up.

From the media perspective, Tet was made for television. For many Americans, Viet Nam was the bloodiest, most vicious, most destructive war in history, an attitude that persists to this day. Images from the war arrived at supper time, unfortunately, with no balance or context, things of minor importance in the race for ratings. The media portrayed Tet as the turning point of the war, the NVA taking the initiative, and was against acknowledging a major military victory, so instead of being able to turn true military success into significant political gain, the military was called on the carpet to explain why they had been taken by surprise.

Three examples of media reporting during Tet probably did more to convince the American public that the war was unwinnable then all other factors combined. The first was the takeover of the American Embassy in Saigon. Reporters Don North and Peter Arnett, who actually filed the first report of the embassy attack, did most of the reporting from the scene and they were very thorough. To read North’s account, you would think that the war was lost then and there. From the media’s point of view, the Anti-Christ was in the Holy of Holies. If we could not even protect our own Embassy, how on earth could we win the war? In reality, the only surprise the military expressed was that the building lasted as long as it did. Given the symbolism of the Embassy, most military types felt that it had a bulls-eye on it from the minute construction began. Some even expressed the idea that, although only three months old, it was arguably the ugliest building in Saigon and probably deserved destruction. And Peter North? He could have overstated the importance of the battle when he said, “But the U.S. Embassy in Saigon? For many Americans this would be the first battle of the Vietnam War they understood.” In his closing remarks before he ran out of film, he said, “Since the lunar New Year, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese have proved they are capable of bold and impressive military moves that Americans here never dreamed could be achieved. Whether they can sustain this onslaught for long remains to be seen. But whatever turn the war now takes, the capture of the U.S. Embassy here for almost seven hours is a psychological victory that will rally and inspire the Viet Cong. Don North, ABC News, Saigon.” He defends his work by saying, “A rush to judgment before all pieces of the puzzle were in place? Perhaps. But there was no time to appoint a committee to study the story. I was on an hourly deadline . . .” ABC killed the closing remarks to the story because editorializing by a correspondent was frowned upon. A single platoon sized action, militarily meaningless, taken entirely out of the context of the bigger picture and submitted to meet a deadline, North’s idea of responsible journalism. And the rallying point for the VC? They didn’t really care, for them it was just one of many suicide missions. North reports, accurately, that the last VC killed was shot by a Colonel Jacobson. North considered it important to his account that he mention that the Colonel “admitted” he was with his Saigon girlfriend. Now that’s important to understanding the battle! And the Americans never dreamed of such an attack? No, because having that many enemy out in the open at once ranked right up there with dating a movie star.

The second example of questionable media reporting was the Battle for Hue. Here, grisly pictures of hard fighting Marines were taken by the planeload. Sadly, what is missing is media outrage over the systematic killing of innocent civilians , about 6,000, including three German doctors, one doctor’s wife, a couple of Benedictine missionaries and a Vietnamese Catholic priest. Probably the biggest single event characterizing the flawed style of reporting that often came out of the war was that of Walter Cronkite, billed as “the most trusted man in America.” Cronkite flew in to Hue on February 10. According to George McArthur, Associated Press’ Saigon bureau chief who covered the war for 10 years and was a no nonsense top notch reporter, “When Cronkite broadcast in Hue during the Tet offensive, he arranged to have a shelling of the ridgeline behind him. This was his famous trip when he supposedly changed his mind. Baloney. He’d made up his mind before he ever came out there. But the Marines staged a shelling at four in the afternoon, and he was up on top of our mission building in Hue doing his stand-upper, wearing a bulletproof vest and a tin pot. And I was up there [on the same roof] doing my laundry. Crap.”

Cronkite filmed the report, artillery going off on cue, then flew home, but later in the month he presented a commentary, supposedly setting aside his impartial observer role, on the folly of U.S. involvement in Viet Nam. This was the one where he used the words, “mired in stalemate.”

Out of the half a dozen battles that lasted longer then a day, why were these two picked as the prime examples of journalistic finesse and, therefore, representative of the entire war? For most of the reporters, I think the answer was simple. First, Saigon and Hue could be gotten in and out of in a civilized manner without severe risk of life and limb. In Hue there were fifty reporters on hand when the battle started, by the time it was over, there were one hundred fifty. And if you didn’t want to stay overnight, you could pull a Cronkite and arrive in the morning and leave before dark. Quite literally, a reporter could drive to where the action was, file a story and be back at his steaks and beer by suppertime.

The third was the reporting of the battle of Khe Sanh. Walter Cronkite, in a weak moment compared Khe Sanh with Dien Bein Phu and said “the parallels are there for all to see.” Anyone who could see the comparison saw no parallels. And Cronkite had not really been there when the fun was happening, although artillery was plentiful, rooftops were scarce. The battles were as different as night and day except to the media who faithfully reminded Americans, almost on a daily basis about the disaster at Dien Bien Phu, reminding Americans that it was a “ghost” haunting Washington. It may have been haunting Washington, but it was no where to be found in Viet Nam. It may come as no surprise that few reporters remained at Khe Sanh for long, just showed up to get some spectacular pictures, which were easy to get, then caught the next flight out.

During the entire course of the war, the Defense department accredited two thousand journalists. That means they could travel anywhere a military unit was and talk to any military personnel that would give them the time of day. In Saigon there were seven thousand journalists, obviously, the vast majority without credentials, so for them travel was very limited. In order to keep drawing a paycheck, they had to produce stories. And the NVA had been good enough to bring the war within walking distance of their hotel. Didn’t even have to miss happy hour.

There was a lot of good reporting that came out of Viet Nam, but I won’t mention it here because reporters every where have spent a lot of print space defending their efforts. But I would like to know where were the reporters when the mass graves were dug up in Hue, people butchered in accordance with Hanoi’s state policy. By comparison, the My Lai murders committed against all policy, by a group of poorly led, poorly trained, undisciplined and out of control soldiers received unbelievable coverage.

So here we have it. We lost 205 men killed at Khe Sanh, 119 killed at Hue, and the VC/NVA lost as many men during Tet as we did in the entire war. Yep, guess the media was right, we lost.

Rotorwash

Matzos · Apr 9, 2005

Great post RW, when is your book going into print?

Bombardier · Apr 9, 2005

Ahh the press, sometimes useful but most of the time a crock of sh*t. I dont think I have ever read a newspaper article that told the story from both sides of the fence. They are either for ya or against ya. Whatever sells papers

rotorwash · Apr 10, 2005

Right on target, Bomber. The self serving scum make it hard for the good reporters to have credibility.

Matzos, as for when the book will come out, my wife thinks my family name is Celtic for "overcommitment." Like the rest of my projects, it is moving at the speed of corrosion in a dry and dusty land. I'm hoping to get fired in the next year or so, then maybe I can finish something.

Matzos · Apr 10, 2005

bombardier said:
Ahh the press, sometimes useful but most of the time a crock of sh*t. I dont think I have ever read a newspaper article that told the story from both sides of the fence. They are either for ya or against ya. Whatever sells papers

I second that.

So RW, hopefully we will get to see the completed thing one day.
Just keep up the postings, they are great to read.

rotorwash · Apr 10, 2005

Thanks Matzos, much appreciated.

Bombardier · May 17, 2005

As I have said before, the information provided by our American Vietnam Veterans is much appreciated and as Matzos says great to read. More importantly it tells us all the true story of VN from those that were there and for that we are much in your Debt.
Thanks for all your input and as I've heard said so many times before "Thanks for your service and Welcome Home"
sal;

Frisco-Kid · May 18, 2005

Hey, RW

Where are you, Bud? Been looking forward to some more Vietnam War history lessons. I've never read a book about the war. Most of what I've learned about the war outside of my own little personal piece of it, has been learned from people like yourself; other veterans who have made a study of it. I WILL read my personally inscribed copy of yours, though.

You're a tough man to get ahold of. I saw you on the Pats Files the other night and e-mailed you through the site. Either e-mail me, or PM me here or there.

rotorwash · May 22, 2005

Hey Tom, sorry to have been gone so long, but things are crazy right now. Yeh, I was lurking over on PF for a while, I think I will just nose around for quite a while before I post anything.

I should just give you my E-mail address, then I wouldn't keep cluttering this place up.

RW

chaser48 · Nov 26, 2005

Excellent Job !!!

To Rotorwash;

First an introduction. 2LT Ramos here, am impressed by the excerpts that you have posted with regard to Tet, and the low quality of media coverage not of that offensive but the entire conflict.
No sir - the US soundly kicked Mr Charles squarly in the butt Tet of 1968 and your writing helps to clarify that piece of history not only for those too young to know but also those who were there and know differently. I kick in the stomach still can hurt after 37 years.
Your work is excellent and I hope to learn when your manuscript will be completed and submitted for publication. There are a lot of books out on the topic Vietnam however, none do so clearly expose the media, overturn the lies of having been caught by surprise and mostly that we lost the war -- that happened here at home by those who would fair better sleeping with the Taliban. I still do not trust the media and am very quick to correct them when they print misleading and inaccurate information. I am PAO S-5
with the California Center for Military History (CCMH - SDFD) State Defense Force Division. I recently was a part of Operation Gulf Relief (aka Katrina) and my energies went toward clarification of how FEMA operates. The truth is that the city of New Orleans turned down the Army Corps of Engineers assistence to retro fit levees after they were awarded a huge sum to do just that in 1965. Anyway, I write about accuracy and your piece and upcoming book will do alot to clean up the falacies surround Vietnam. Thanks and good luck with the task.
salutations
Chaser

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