Warfare Operation Verdict, The French plan to arrest Nasser and capture the Suez Canal

[Yahia Al Shaer]

Operation Verdict
The French plan to arrest Nasser
and capture the Suez Canal​

France was eager to implement, "Operation Verdict " which depends on advancing the French troops southwards, to Ismailia , then branch both to Cairo to either arrest or assasinate Nasser and tumble his government .. In the meantime, the rest of the selected units would proceed to Suez , to capture the complete water way of the Suez Canal.

Britain opposed implementing this plan, that was to be commanded by General Jaques Massu



Dr: Yahia Al Shaer

Operation Verdict, The French plan to arrest Nasser and capture the Suez Canal

http://www.geocities.com/yahia_al_shaer/

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The Egyptian Army Operation Orders​

The other side of the coin

Suez War 1956

By Yahia Al Shaer


ISBN 977 – 08 – 1245 - 5

 

[Dr.Yahia Al Shaer]

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The French plan "Verdict" to restore and impose the presidency of Major General Mohamed Naguib 1956​

The question increases about the reasons for transferring Major General Mohamed Jeb to another region in southern Egypt, when the tripartite aggression against Egypt began on October 29, 1956 ...

The following lines of the sentence on Dr. Rajab help in setting the "goal and truth" that had to be avoided, and the reason for taking these preventive measures ...

quotation:
He also hid Muhammad Naguib and smuggled him in Upper Egypt during the tripartite aggression in 56, for fear of the aggressors taking over Cairo, then appointing Muhammad Naguib as president, or sending them to summon King Farouk to install him again as king of Egypt

General Intelligence knows the French intend to implement the "Verdict" plan.

The French did not abandon their plans for the necessity to occupy all the navigational course of the Suez Canal and place it under their colonial control, in addition to the necessity to overthrow the national rule in Cairo, and the French military had prepared a purely French offensive plan that the British did not know about, and they did not consider the use of any of the British units. Despite the fact that many Britons know Cairo and Suez in real terms, which shows the first mistake that the French planners made during the preparation of the VERDICT plan.

Despite all this secrecy and caution from the British ally, the General Intelligence was able to obtain the secret information and the details of this French military plan with the sudden parachute landing in Ismailia and the sudden advance south to Suez and west to Cairo to achieve the basic principle of the Anglo-French invasion, which called President Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the Republic to Assignment of the author, AH Saad Afra, to go immediately to Port Said and infiltrate to face the situation

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The referee’s plan, VERDICT, to control the canal and advance to Cairo

The French also did not give up their hopes for the need to bring down the national rule in Cairo in retaliation for Nasser’s support for the revolution in Algeria, and the Suez War was an opportunity that the French military did not want to escape from their hands to achieve this goal, and accordingly the French military devised a purely French offensive plan that he did not know about. The British and the aim of the French was to occupy all the navigational course of the Suez Canal and place it under their colonial control, then march to Cairo to kidnap Abdel Nasser and accelerate the overthrow of the national government

It is noted that in order to preserve secrecy and caution, the French military planners did not consider the use of any of the British units, despite the fact that many Britons knew Cairo and Suez in real terms, which shows the first mistake that the French planners made during the preparation of the "Verdict" plan.

Below is a brief summary ... of what happened at the time, and I explain its full details in my book "The Other Face of the Medal" ... until this incident is unveiled.

It is also noted that I have added some pages from the book "Suez" Retrospective and Reappraisal, which also goes into those details.

General Jacques Massou, who was commanding the French ground forces, wrote down the Verdict operation plan for the French forces to advance to Ismailia and Suez and branch to Cairo in order to overthrow the national government and arrest President Gamal Abdel Nasser, p. 212 from the book The Truth about Suez, La Verite sur Suez, by General Jacques Massou And Henri Le Maire (54)

Verdict Referee Plan
The plan "Verdict, whose existence was confirmed by General Jacques Massou in his book" The Truth About Suez 1956 ", is based on a surprise secret parachute landing to fulfill their intention to advance and occupy the entire Suez Canal. The French military, including Colonel Jules Joubert, investigated it in the early hours of November 7, 1956, immediately after the implementation of the United Nations decision to stop the launching of the Tarr had it not been for the opposition of the British General Huh Stockwell, commander of the Joint Land Forces, and the Verdict operation was summarized in the following

1 - The French plan ... "Verdict" was one of the basic plans laid down for the tripartite aggression, which "General Jacques Masso" was determined to implement, after the implementation of the "Just Telescot" plan.

2- But General Sir Charles Keightley ... the commander in chief of the campaign, and General Hugh Stockwell ... the commander of the ground forces, offered to implement it ...

3 - Summary of the French plan ...

• A - The French forces will advance to Al-Hanawi, to take Al-Qantara ...
• B - the progressive progression to Ismailia ... and from there, it branches out into two directions

1. - Continue to Suez to invade and occupy the city
2. - Turn east to Cairo, in order to arrest and arrest Helly Janal Abdel Nasser ... and upon the resistance ... kill him

• C - Imposing the presidency of Major General Mohamed Naguib ... "by force" and appointing old politicians to a new ministry ...

Major General AH Muhammad Naguib was not aware of this plan at all ... before the aggression ... and when he learned from the presidency of what he was planning ... and although they had previously removed him from his posts in 1954, he expressed his dissatisfaction ... He also expressed his support for the Revolutionary Command Council, the revolution and Abdel Nasser ... And he expressed his immediate agreement to cooperate and transfer his residence and residence to a safe place in the South ...

No one has ever contacted Major General Muhammad Najib ... whether from France or England from the West before, during, or after the aggression ... and his opinion was not consulted or taken on this purely French case ... whether before or ... during ... or after Aggression ... and no one contacted, consulted, or taken his opinion ...

4 - The Egyptian military attaché in Paris ... Dr. "Al-Bekbashi" Tharwat Okasha "at the time" got the details of the plans of the tripartite aggression in full on October 27, 1956.

5- Mr. Abdul-Rahman Sadiq, the Egyptian press attaché at the Egyptian embassy in Paris, carried the plan ... in a diplomatic bag ... it was fixed to his wrist and boarded the plane via Boxel to Cairo and arrived at dawn on Tuesday, October 28, 1956

6 - The Egyptian press attaché went to the headquarters of the Council of Ministers, which was located "at that time" on Al-Qasr Al-Aini Street, adjacent to Parliament

7 - He asked to meet Gamal Abdel Nasser to hand him over ... private documents from Paris, and Tharwat Okasha had told Cairo wirelessly

8 - He met the Egyptian press attaché, Ali Sabry, the Egyptian press attaché ... and asked him to hand him the bag, and he refused ... and determined to hand it over to Gamal Abdel Nasser ... according to orders

9 - Ali Sabry responded ... and went together to the office of Gamal Abdel Nasser ... and the bag was opened with the designated key located in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ... and a copy of it is in the General Intelligence and the maps and detailed documents were handed over to Abdel Nasser .... on Tuesday morning the 28th October 1956

10 - The documents were handed over ... and Nasser read the "summary", the military assessment and the Egyptian military attaché's suggestions ... during the presence of the Egyptian press attaché ...

11 - There was no time to take all preventive military measures against aggression (air defense ... for some institutions and factories) and the like. "

12 - Many preventive measures have been taken ... whether in the "military" field ... including ...

• A - Intensifying the distribution of anti-aircraft guns around the radio station dispatch center in Jabal Abu Zaabal ...
• B - Increasing ambushes against tanks and personnel on the branching roads that lead to Cairo ...
• C - Reducing focus on Alexandria and part of it to the boat ... and around it ... the Suez Desert Road ... the Ismailia agricultural road ... and all the roads heading east from the Suez Canal area

13 - To take other measures on the "personal" sphere ... and that includes the issue of Muhammad Najib ... and some military and politicians move to other places of residence.

14 - Preparing military command centers in the Delta ... and others


Below are lines from the report

Par le lieutenant-colonel Carré.
Which they posted on
la Revue historique des armées, °
Le soutien logistique pendant la campagne de Suez: extrait du rapport du général Beaufre


quotation:

Pour la clarté de l'exposé, on distinguera deux périodes pendant l'occupation:
Période du 7 au 21 novembre correspondant à la mise à 1 -terre des éléments prévus pour l'occupation, suivie d'un allègement.
Période du 21 novembre au 22 décembre correspondant 2 -à la préparation de la reprise des opérations (Verdict) et à la préparation et à l'exécution du rembarquement (Harridan).


Take precedence over the question, to you and to anyone else

1 - How would you behave if you were Gamal Abdel Nasser ... ??????

2 - What are the preventive measures "with regard to Najeeb" that you would have resorted to ???


Allow me to answer ... since I guess your patriotism

I think you would have acted like that, too



Dr.. Yahia Al Shaer

An excerpt from my book
The other side of the medal, Suez War 1956,
Secrets of the Secret Resistance in Port Said
Written by YahIa Al Shaer
Second edition 2006 Extended edition
Deposit No. 1848 2006
ISBN 977-8-1245-5

PS:

Please note, that the abovementioned lines, are Google Translation of the topic, I published
before, in many Arabic Forums... I apologize, for any - eventual - translation mistakes,
should ever and whenever they excist.

Dr.. YahIa Al Shaer

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Dr. Yahia Al Shaer​