The Six Day War

[John A Silkstone]

THE SIX DAY WAR BETWEEN ISRAIL AND EGYPT

Main reasons for the war

The earlier 1956 Suez War was a military defeat but a political victory for the Egyptians. Heavy diplomatic pressure forced Israel to withdraw its military from the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. (In 1956 I was posted to 20 Field Regiment Royal Artillery and was stationed in Woolwich London. We had painted the vehicles and weapons sand brown and had moved down to Southampton docks ready for mobilization for the Suez crisis as it was known as.)

After the 1956 war, Egypt, although not Israel, agreed to the stationing of a UN peacekeeping force in the Sinai, UNEF, to keep that border region demilitarized and prevent guerrillas from crossing the border into Israel. As a result the border between Egypt and Israel quieted for a while. The war's aftermath saw the region return to an uneasy balance without any real resolution of the region's difficulties. At the time, no Arab state had recognized Israel.

In 1960, Syrian guerrilla raids began to infiltrate into Israel under the name of "people's war of liberation".

On April 7, 1967, a minor border incident escalated into a full-scale aerial battle over the Golan Heights, resulting in the loss of six Syrian MiG-21s to Israeli Air Force (IAF) Dassault Mirage III, and the latter's flight over Damascus.

Other border incidents in which Israel and Syria exchanged artillery, tank and aircraft fire increased the tensions along this front. The Israeli government was under heavy pressure to put an end to Syrian shelling of its border villages.

On 18 May, 1967, Egypt formally requested the withdrawal of UNEF from Sinai. UN Secretary-General U Thant complied.

Once this buffer zone was removed, the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser then began the re-militarization of the Sinai, and concentrated tanks and troops on the border with Israel.

On 23 May, Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to impose a blockade to the Israeli port of Eilat at the northern end of the Gulf of Aqaba.

Israel viewed the closure of the straits with alarm and demanded the US and UK to open the straits as they guaranteed they would in 1957. Harold Wilson the UK Prime Minister proposed an international maritime force to quell the crisis and this was accepted by US President Johnson, but received little international support.

The23 May saw the Israeli cabinet meeting as a war council and they decided to launch a pre-emptive strike if the Straits of Tiran were not re-opened within 48 hours. They later agreeing to a delay of two weeks at the request of the USA. (It should be noted that a blockade or even partial blockade, is generally defined as an act of war.

In his speech to Arab trade unionists on 26 May, Nasser announced: "If Israel embarks on an aggression against Syria or Egypt, the battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel."

On May 30, Jordan signed a mutual defence treaty with Egypt, thereby joining the military alliance already in place between Egypt and Syria. Jordanian forces were placed under the command of Egyptian General Abdul Munim Riad. This put Arab forces just 17 kilometres from Israel's coast, a jump-off point from which a well coordinated tank assault would likely cut Israel in two within half an hour. Such a coordinated attack from the West Bank was always viewed by the Israeli leadership as a threat to Israel's existence. On the same day, Nasser proclaimed: "The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are poised on the borders of Israel, while standing behind us are the armies of Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan and the whole Arab nation.

This act astound the world. At the same time, several other Arab states not bordering Israel, including Iraq, Sudan, Kuwait and Algeria, also began mobilizing their armed forces.

This is the end of part 1. I will continue tomorrow.

Silky

[John A Silkstone]

THE SIX DAY WAR BETWEEN ISRAIL AND EGYPT

Part two

On the 1st June minister of defence Moshe Dayan called Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, the GOC, Southern Command together with Brigadier General Yeshayahu Gavish and he present plans which were to be implemented against Egypt. Rabin had formulated a plan in which Southern Command would fight its way to the Gaza Strip and then hold the territory and its population hostage until Egypt agreed to reopen the Straits of Tiran. Brigadier General Gavish had a more comprehensive plan that called for the destruction of Egyptian forces in the Sinai.

Rabin favoured Gavish's plan, which was then endorsed by Dayan with the caution that a simultaneous offensive against Syria should be avoided.

Newly declassified documents reveal that the United States of America had worked feverishly behind the scenes attempting to "hold the Israeli tiger" in the days leading up to war. The Johnson Administration received guarantees from Egypt that it would not strike first and arranged a diplomatic visit on the 6th June 1967 with Egyptian envoy Zakaria Mohieddinn. The diplomatic cable stated "we hope it will be possible for him to come without delay" and there were high hopes in the Johnson Administration that the visit would lead to the end of the crisis.

On June 4, Iraq joined the military alliance with Egypt, Jordan and Syria.

CONDITION OF COMBATANT ARMIES

In May 1967 the Egyptian Army had a nominal strength of around 150,000, but 50-70,000 of its soldiers, including its elite units, were fighting in the Yemen civil war, leading some of Nasser's commanders to the belief that Egypt was in no position to fight.

Nasser's had mixed feelings about his goals and objectives and this was reflected in his orders to the military.

The general staff changed the operational plan four times in May 1967, with each change requiring the redeployment of troops to a new location, with the inevitable toll on both men and vehicles. Towards the end of May.

Nasser finally forbade the general staff from proceeding with the Qahir ("Victory") plan, which called for the light infantry to be in forward fortifications, and the bulk of Egyptian forces held back to conduct a massive counterattack against the main Israeli advance. Instead, he ordered a main forward defence action in the Sinai.

During this time he continued to take actions intended to increase the level of mobilization of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in order to bring unbearable pressure on Israel. Jordan's army had a total strength of 55,000, but it too was embroiled in the fighting in Yemen. Syria's army had 75,000 soldiers.

Israel’s army, including its reservists, totalled 264,000 troops of .

PRELIMINARY AIR ATTACK

Israel's first important move was a pre-emptive attack on the Egyptian Air Force. It was the largest and the most modern Arab air forces and consisting of about 450 combat aircraft, all of them Soviet-built and relatively new.

Israel’s main concern was the 30 TU-16 Badger medium bombers which could and would have inflicting heavy damage the Israeli military and civilian centres.

On the 5th June at 7:45 Israeli time, as civil defence sirens sounded all over Israel, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) launched Operation Focus (Moked). All but four of its 197 operational jets left the skies of Israel in a mass attack against Egypt's airfields.

Egyptian defensive infrastructure was extremely poor. None of the airfields were equipped with armoured bunkers to protect their planes in the event of an attack.

The Israeli warplanes headed out over the Mediterranean Sea before heading toward Egypt.

This was a most opportune time as the Egyptians hindered their own defence by closing down their entire air defence system: they were worried that rebel Egyptian forces would shoot down the plane carrying Field Marshal Amer and Lt-Gen. Sidqi Mahmoud, who were en route from al Maza to Bir Tamada in the Sinai to meet the commanders of the troops stationed there.

The Israeli pilots flew below the Egyptian radar cover and well below the lowest point at which its SA-2 surface-to-air missile batteries could bring down an aircraft.

The Israelis employed a mixed attack strategy; bombing and strafing runs against the planes themselves, and tarmac-shredding penetration bombs dropped on the runways that rendered them unusable. Thus leaving any undamaged planes unable to take off and therefore helpless targets for later attacks.

The attack was so successful in destroying virtually all of the Egyptian Air Force on the ground with only a few casualties on the Israelis.

Over 300 aircraft and 100 combat pilots were lost to the Egyptians while the Israelis lost only 19 planes which were mostly operational losses (i.e. mechanical failure, accidents, etc). The attack guaranteed Israeli air superiority during the rest of the war.

Before the war, Israeli pilots and ground crews trained extensively in rapid refitting of aircraft returning from sorties. This meant that a single aircraft could engage in up to four sorties a day

This enabled the IAF to send several attack waves into Egypt on the first day of the war.

These continuing air attacks contributed to the Arab belief that the IAF was being helped by foreign air forces.

Following the success of the attacks against the major Egyptian airfields, further attacks were made later in the day against secondary airfields in Egypt as well as Jordanian, Syrian and even Iraqi fields.

Throughout the war, Israeli aircraft continued strafing airfield runways to prevent their return to usability.

[John A Silkstone]

THE SIX DAY WAR CONTINUED

Part three

CONQUEST OF SINAI. JUNE 7-JUNE 8, 1967

The Egyptian forces consisted of 7 divisions, one mechanized infantry, two infantry, and four armoured.

Egypt had around 100,000 troops and 900-950 tanks in the Sinai, backed by 1,100 APCs and 1000 artillery pieces. This arrangement was based on the Soviet doctrine, where mobile armour units at strategic depth provide a dynamic defence while infantry units engage in defensive battles.

Israeli forces concentrated on the border with Egypt and included: 1 infantry brigade, 1 mechanized infantry brigade, 3 paratrooper brigades, 6 armoured brigades, , and 700 tanks and a total of around 70,000 men, organized in three armoured divisions.

The Israeli plan was to surprise the Egyptian forces in both timing (i.e., pre-emptive attack exactly coinciding with the time the IAF was due to strike the Egyptian airfields), location (attacking via northern and central Sinai routes.

Intelligence had it that the Egyptian expected a repeat of the 1956 war, when the IDF attacked via the central and southern routes.

Israeli most northern division, consisting of three brigades and commanded by Major General Israel Tal, one of Israel's most prominent armour commanders. His troops advanced slowly through the Gaza Strip and El-Arish, which were not heavily protected.

Maj. Gen. Avraham Yoffe commanded the central division and the southern division.

Maj. Gen. Ariel Sharon, however, entered the heavily defended Abu-Ageila-Kusseima region. Egyptian forces there included one infantry division (the 2nd), a battalion of tank destroyers and a tank regiment. At that moment, Sharon initiated an attack, precisely planned, coordinated and carried out.

He sent out two of his brigades to the north of Um-Katef, the first one ordered to break through the defences at Abu-Ageila to the south, and the second to block the road to El-Arish and to encircle Abu-Ageila from the east. At the same time, a paratrooper force was heli-borne to the rear of the defensive positions to destroy the artillery, preventing it from engaging the armour and infantry.

Combined forces of armour, paratroopers, infantry, artillery and combat engineers then attacked the Egyptian disposition from the front, flanks and rear, cutting the enemy off. The breakthrough battles, which were in sandy areas and minefields, continued for three and-a-half days until Abu-Ageila fell.

Many of the Egyptian units remained intact and could be scrambled to prevent Israeli units from reaching the Suez Canal or engage in combat in the attempt to reach the canal. However, when the Egyptian Minister of Defence, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer heard about the fall of Abu-Ageila, he panicked and ordered all units in the Sinai to retreat. This order effectively meant the defeat of Egypt.

Israeli soldiers often traded their unreliable carbines and short-range Uzis for AK-47s taken from captured or killed Arab soldiers.

Due to the Egyptians' retreat, the Israeli High Command decided not to pursue the Egyptian units but rather to bypass and destroy them in the mountainous passes of West Sinai. In the following two days (June 6 and 7) all three Israeli divisions rushed westwards and reached the passes.

Sharon's division first went southward then westward to Mitla Pass. It was joined there by parts of Yoffe's division, while its other units blocked the Gidi Pass. Tal's units stopped at various points to the length of the Suez Canal.

Israel's blocking action was only partially successful. Only the Gidi pass was captured before the Egyptians approached it, but at other places Egyptian units did manage to pass through and cross the Canal to safety.

In four days of operations, the Israeli victories were impressive. They defeated the largest and most heavily equipped Arab army, leaving Sinai littered with burning or abandoned Egyptian vehicles and military equipment.

By the 8th June, Israel had completed the Sinai capture by sending infantry units to Ras-Sudar on the western coast, Sharm El-Sheikh, at its southern tip, had already been captured a day earlier by units of the Israeli Navy.

Several tactical elements made the swift Israeli advance possible: first, the complete air superiority over its Egyptian counterpart; second, its complete implementation of all its battle plans; and third, the lack of coordination among Egyptian troops.

[John A Silkstone]

THE SIX DAY WAR CONTINUED

Part four

The Jordan salient. June 5-7

King Hussein reluctant for Jordan to enter the war. Some claim that Nasser used the obscurity of the first hours of the conflict to convince Hussein that he was victorious; as evidence, he claimed that a radar sighting of a squadron of Israeli aircraft returning from bombing raids in Egypt was in fact Egyptian aircraft en route to attacking Israel.

King Hussein decided to attack and sent one of his brigades that were stationed in the West Bank to be deployed in the Hebron area in order to link with the Egyptians.

Prior to the war, Jordanian forces included 11 brigades totalling some 55,000 troops, equipped by some 300 modern Western tanks. Of these, 9 brigades were deployed in the West Bank and 2 in the Jordan Valley. The forces were organized in 4 divisions, one of them being the elite armoured 40th. The Jordanian ground army was relatively well-equipped and well-trained. Furthermore, Israeli post-war briefings claimed that the Jordanian staff acted professionally as well, but was always left "half a step" behind by the Israeli moves.

The Royal Jordanian Air Force, however, consisted of only about 20 Hawker Hunter fighters, obsolete by all standards.

Israeli Central Command forces consisted of five brigades. Of these, two were permanently stationed near Jerusalem and were called the Jerusalem Brigade and the mechanized Harel Brigade. Mordechai Gur's 35th paratrooper brigade was summoned from the Sinai front.

An armoured brigade was allocated from the General Staff reserve and brought to the Latrun area. The 10th armoured brigade was stationed north of Samaria. The Israeli Northern Command provided a division (3 brigades) led by Maj. Gen. Elad Peled, which was stationed to the north of Samaria, in the Jezreel Valley.

The IDF's plan was to remain on the defensive along the Jordanian front; however, on the morning of the 5th June, Jordanian forces made thrusts in the area of Jerusalem, occupying Government House used as the headquarters for the UN observers and shelled the Israeli (western) part of the city.

Units in Qalqiliya fired in the direction of Tel-Aviv. The Royal Jordanian Air Force attacked Israeli airfields. Both air and artillery attacks caused little damage. Israeli units were scrambled to attack Jordanian forces in the West Bank. In the afternoon of that same day. Israeli Air Force (IAF) strikes destroyed the Royal Jordanian Air Force. By the evening of that day, the Jerusalem infantry brigade moved south of Jerusalem, while the mechanized Harel and Gur's paratroopers encircled it from the north.

On the 6th June, the Israeli units attacked: The reserve paratroop brigade completed the Jerusalem encirclement in the bloody Battle of the Ammunition Hill. The infantry brigade attacked the fortress at Latrun capturing it at daybreak, and advanced through Beit Horon towards Ramallah. The Harel brigade continued its push to the mountainous area of north-west Jerusalem, linking the Mount Scopus campus of Hebrew University with the city of Jerusalem. By the evening, the brigade arrived in Ramallah. The IAF detected and destroyed the 60th Jordanian Brigade en-route from Jericho to reinforce Jerusalem.

In the north, one battalion from Peled's division was sent to check Jordanian defences in the Jordan Valley. A brigade belonging to Peled's division captured Western Samaria, another captured Jenin and the third (equipped with light French AMX-13s) engaged Jordanian Pattons main battle tanks to the east.

On 7 June heavy fighting ensued. Gur's paratroopers entered the Old City of Jerusalem via the Lion's Gate, and captured the Western Wall and the Temple Mount. The Jerusalem brigade then reinforced them, and continued to the south, capturing Judea, Gush Etzion and Hebron. The Harel brigade proceeded eastward, descending to the Jordan River. In Samaria, one of Peled's brigades seized Nablus; then it joined one of Central Command's armoured brigades to fight the Jordanian forces which held the advantage of superior equipment and were equal in numbers to the Israelis.

Again, the air superiority of the IAF proved paramount as it immobilized the enemy, leading to its defeat. One of Peled's brigades joined with its Central Command counterparts coming from Ramallah, and the remaining two blocked the Jordan River crossings together with the Central Command's 10th. The latter crossed the Jordan River into the East Bank to provide cover for Israeli combat engineers while they blew the bridges, but was quickly pulled back because of American pressure.

[John A Silkstone]

THE SIX DAY WAR CONTINUED

Part five

THE BATTLE OF GOLAN HEIGHTS, JUNE 9-10

During the evening of the 5th of June, Israeli air strikes destroyed two thirds of the Syrian Air Force, and forced the remaining third to retreat to distant bases, without playing any further role in the ensuing warfare. A minor Syrian force tried to capture the water plant at Tel Dan.

Several Syrian tanks are reported to have sunk in the Jordan River. In any case, the Syrian command abandoned hopes of a ground attack, and began a massive shelling of Israeli towns in the Hula Valley instead.

On the 7th and 8th June, A debate had been going on in the Israeli leadership whether the Golan Heights should be assailed as well. Military advice was that the attack would be extremely costly, as it would be an uphill battle against a strongly fortified enemy. The western side of the Golan Heights consists of a rock escarpment that rises 500 metres (1700 ft) from the Sea of Galilee and the Jordan River to a more gently sloping plateau.

Moshe Dayan believed such an operation would yield losses of 30,000, and opposed it bitterly. Levi Eshkol, on the other hand, was more open to the possibility of an operation in the Golan Heights, as was the head of the Northern Command, David Elazar, whose unbridled enthusiasm for and confidence in the operation may have eroded Dayan's reluctance. However, as the situation on the Southern and Central fronts cleared up, Moshe Dayan became more enthusiastic about the idea, and he authorized the operation.

The Syrian army consisted of about 75,000 men grouped in 9 brigades, supported by an adequate amount of artillery and armour. Israeli forces used in combat consisted of two brigades. The armoured one was led by Albert Mandler and the Golani Brigade) in the northern part of the front. The other was infantry, being one of Peled's brigades summoned from Jenin in the centre.

The Golan Heights' unique terrain of mountainous slopes crossed by parallel streams every several kilometres ran east to west. The general lack of roads in the area caused both forces to move along an east-west ax of movement, thus restricting the ability of the units to support the troops on either flank.

The Syrians could move north and south on the plateau and the Israelis could move north and south at the base of the Golan escarpment. An advantage Israel possessed was the excellent intelligence collected by Mossad operative Eli Cohen (who was captured and executed in Syria in 1965) regarding the Syrian battle positions.

The IAF, which had been attacking Syrian artillery for four days prior to the attack, was ordered to attack Syrian positions with all its force. While the well-protected artillery was mostly undamaged, the ground forces staying on the Golan plateau of which there was 6 of their 9 brigades, became unable to organize a defence. By the evening of the 9th June, the four Israeli brigades had broken through to the plateau, where they could be reinforced and replaced.

On the next day, June 10th, the central and northern groups joined in a pincer movement on the plateau, but that fell mainly on empty territory as the Syrian forces fled.

Several units joined by Elad Peled climbed to the Golan from the south, only to find the positions mostly empty as well. During the day, the Israeli units stopped after obtaining manoeuvring room between their positions and a line of volcanic hills to the west. To the east the ground terrain is an open gently sloping plain. This position later became the cease-fire line known as the "Purple Line".

[John A Silkstone]

THE SIX DAY WAR CONTINUED

Part six

WAR IN THE AIR

During the Six-Day War, the IAF demonstrated the importance of air superiority.

During the course of a modern conflict, especially in a desert theatre of conflict. Following the IAF's preliminary air attack, it was able to thwart and harass the Arab air forces and to grant itself air superiority over all fronts; it then complemented the strategic effect of their initial strike by carrying out tactical support operations. Of particular interest was the destruction of the Jordanian 60th armoured brigade near Jericho and the attack on the Iraqi armoured brigade which was sent to attack Israel through Jordan.

In contrast, the Arab air forces never managed to mount an effective attack: Attacks of Jordanian fighters and Egyptian TU-16 bombers into the Israeli rear during the first two days of the war were not successful and led to the destruction of the aircraft. Egyptian bombers were shot down while Jordan's fighters were destroyed during the attack on the airfield.
On the 6th June, the second day of the war, King Hussein and Nasser declared that American and British aircraft took part in the Israeli attacks. This announcement was intercepted by the Israelis and turned into media frenzy. This became known as "The Big Lie" in American and British circles

WAR AT SEA
War at sea was extremely limited. Movements of both Israeli and Egyptian vessels are known to have been used to intimidate the other side, but neither side directly engaged the other at sea. The only moves that yielded any result were the use of six Israeli frogmen in Alexandria harbour (they were captured, having sunk a minesweeper), and the Israeli light boat crews that captured the abandoned Sharm El-Sheikh on the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula on the 7th June.

On the 8th June the USS Liberty, a United States Navy electronic intelligence vessel sailing 13 nautical miles off al-Arish which was outside Egypt's territorial waters), was attacked by Israeli air and sea forces, nearly sinking the ship and causing heavy casualties. Israel claimed the attack was a case of mistaken identity, apologized for the mistake, and paid restitution to the victims or their families. The truth of the Israeli claim is still debated to this day

CONCLUSION OF CONFLICT AND POST-WAR SITUATION
By the 10th of June, Israel had completed its final offensive in the Golan Heights and a ceasefire was signed the following day.

Israel had seized the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank of the Jordan River (including East Jerusalem), and the Golan Heights. Overall, Israel's territory grew by a factor of 3, including about one million Arabs placed under Israel's direct control in the newly captured territories. Israel's strategic depth grew to at least 300 kilometres in the south, 60 kilometres in the east and 20 kilometres of extremely rugged terrain in the north.

In my service days, a man could not be promoted unless he had certain education qualifications and courses under his belt. The six day war was one of the items I selected to write about to get my A levels in military history.

Silky

[ralphrepo]

Where did the USS Liberty fit into all this?

Ralph

[Reloader]

Ralphrepo, have a look here for more info on the attack on USS Liberty:

http://www.militaryimages.net/forums/showthread.php?t=4479&highlight=liberty

[ralphrepo]

Ralphrepo, have a look here for more info on the attack on USS Liberty:

http://www.militaryimages.net/forums/showthread.php?t=4479&highlight=liberty
Thanks, Reloader. Positively jaw dropping information. Makes you wonder why the US even supports Israel; bunch of back stabbing "allies" if you ask me.

Ralph

[Hollis]

Thanks, Reloader. Positively jaw dropping information. Makes you wonder why the US even supports Israel; bunch of back stabbing "allies" if you ask me.

Ralph

This is a very heated issue, a lot of the information on the attack was classified till a few years ago. A judge went throught the newly released information, the recording from the Israeli pilot and basically stated it was a terrible accident.

During the cold war this incident has been used to "promote" hostility towards Israel. It is still use to divide us in this war on terrorism.

The pilot was never intereviewed until recently, even though there is a "false interview" of him floating around. He stated that noone ever asked him anything about the Attack.

This is a site from the judge who reviewed the new information.

http://libertyincident.com/book.html

http://www.israelnewsagency.com/ussliberty.html

You can get additional information to google other reports. Part of the Original "opinions" came from a lack of information,. The US government, offically recognized it was a accident, but kept pertinent information as classified. The recording of the Pilots transmission confirms the accident.

The Media has been used to create a climate of a dominate attitude, that has cost the US dearly. Suchs as the Viet-Nam war, the negative attributes generally associated with it where fictious of vastly over stated.

This incident is just another one.

Edited to add there are counter threads on the internet, just need to google the Judges name.

[Hollis]

I found another link on Judge Cristol,

http://hnn.us/articles/369.html