A Bridge Too Far

[82Rigger]

Just wondering what you all think of the movie A BRIDGE TOO FAR.
Having been airborne, the movie holds a special place for me, but beyond that, I thought the cast was excellent in all nationalities...British, American, German, and Dutch.

[HighlandSniper58]

This has to be an all time classic representation of one of the bigest cock-ups in military history.

I have visited the area several times, and besides exploring the Arnhem area, I have followed the 30 Corps route up across the various bridges towards the final objective Arnhem.

The movie had a five star cast list, although some of the casting was a bit dubious. I had the good fortune to be acquianted with Brig. J.O.E. Vandeleur, who as a Lt. Col. in 1944 had been played by Michael Caine of all people - not the best bit of casting.

The sheer scale of this film must have been a logistics nightmare, but they pulled it off and made a great film out of the story.

One question I find myself asking every time I watch the film is "was Boy Browning really as stupid as the film portrays"? To ignore the Dutch intelligence on the Panzer Divisions in the Arnhem area was just incredible.

[82Rigger]

Your comment about Gen Browning is also what I wonder about. I have seen the film many times AND read the book several times. I understand that Allied intelligence had previously had some bad experiences with French underground reports. I'm sure that Gen Browning must have been wary of accepting Dutch reports at face value. But to ignore recon photos of German armor is ludicrous.
Also, I wonder whose job it was to keep track of 9th and 10th Panzers?
If they had "fallen out of sight" of Allied intelligence, then ANY new reports of German armor ANYWHERE should have been a red flag.

Methinks that this is a case of bureacracy, ego, and political pressure pushing aside normal caution and common sense. How many times have we seen that before...CHALLENGER, COLUMBIA, et al.

The film and the book excellently portray the withdrawal of Urquhart's remaining forces from Arnhem. But I've always wondered...how did they remove 82nd and 101st units? And XXX Corps?

[Bombardier]

I have just watched it again after a long time, I had forgotten how good it was!. One thing puzzled me though......they made an attempt to portray Montgomery out to be a complete idiot and that the choice to have patton command was a better one. now this dissapointed me because, Montgomery was a fine commander as was Patton. Had they forgotten what Monty did in Africa with the 8th Army??.

Anyway twas a fine and dandy film ;) 8)

[82Rigger]

...that Market-Garden failed?

Was it the plan?

The logistics?

The 9th and 10th Panzers?

Or a combination of things?

[Bombardier]

It was a combination of broken radios,a stupid commander who ignored his staffs concerns because he did not want to cancel the operation.of course the panzers ,some bad luck and a lack of logistical planning.

overall i think the basic plan was a good one and could have been 100% succesful if it had been planned for a little while longer and not encountered the above points.

comunications and logistics are a vital part of any warfare ;)

[battleshipbob]

An excellent movie. I really liked it. Although it did make me wonder a few things. One, was Gen. Browning really that much of an idot?? Two, the movie made it look like the 101st. and 82nd Airborne Divisions had a cake walk compared to the Brits. Granted, they didn't have a couple of Panzer Divisions to deal with, but surely it was as easy as the movie portrayed. Was Eindhoven taken that easily?? I Know Neimegan (spelling is off on that I think) was a real bitch of a fight.

[Reloader]

...that Market-Garden failed?

Was it the plan?

The logistics?

The 9th and 10th Panzers?

Or a combination of things?

My impression is that it failed because of a combination of things, which have been written about and discussed extensively, such as - An airborne army sitting in the UK and having already had several operations cancelled because of the speed of Allied advances, the need to use this army soon before they started going stale from inactivity, failing to drop all troops at once, drop zones too far from objective, poor quality comms equipment, mistrust of Dutch resistance reports re armour in area, overconfidence about XXX Corps' ability to advance timeously up a single road, etc.
Also, 1st Airborne Division Commander, Maj. Gen. Roy Urquhart was not told about the presence of 9th & 10th SS Panzer Divisions in Arnhem. 'Boy' Browning estimated the German strength as about a 'brigade group 'of 6,500, supported by 'a few tanks'. What he didn't appreciate, or know, was that the force consisted of some of Germany's toughest, most battle-hardened armoured troops who had been well trained in opposing airborne landings. What has to be acknowledged as well, is the fighting qualities of the German soldier, led by first-class NCO's and junior officers, their ability to quickly and effectively respond to battlefield situations, especially in recognising the 1st Airborne's objective and placing blocking lines across the airborne troops' line of advance.
As late as 15th September, Eisenhower offered Monty one of the American Divisions to assist at Arnhem, because of the perceived threat to 1st Airborne, but he rejected it, saying that it was too late to change or postpone the plan. Who knows what difference that may have made?

[Kitrap]

"Operation Market Garden," also known as "A Bridge Too Far," was doomed to failure from the beginning though no fault of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and Genral Browning. The reasons being, firstly, due to the initial inaccuracy of underground reports and when they became more accurate, no one paid any attention to them and especially to the fact that the Panzers, after being pushed back from France after the D - Day landings, moved into Arnhem. Secondly, the in ability to move back up troops into action due to the weather. Thirdly, the whole operation was a logistical nightmare as a lot of the equipment failed to work. Lastly, one aircraft, carrying information and important maps, crashed after being shot down, the information was found by the Germans, who went on to use it in the most effective manner against the Allies. But had this operation succeeded, then there was no doubt that the war would have come to an end before April 1945 as the plan was brilliant, bur as mentioned was doomed to failure.